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**The Representation of Women's Concerns in the Russian State Dumas:
Voting Patterns of Female Legislators**

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The collapse of the Soviet Union deeply affected virtually all norms regulating Russia's social life, including the law. In the new context, women have become a marginalised social groupⁱ the interests of whom are especially in need of protection. By examining roll call votesⁱⁱ for the 1995 and 1999 Dumas (the Lower House of Russia's Federal Assembly) this study assesses whether female deputies to the Duma are better suited to handle women's concerns than male legislators are. I will also analyse the legislative contexts that facilitate female legislators' ability to band together to vote in favour of women's goals. In Russia, women tend to be under-represented within elected bodies.ⁱⁱⁱ In the State Duma elected in 1995, only 46 of 450 deputies were women (10.2 per cent). In the current Duma elected in 1999 the number of women dropped to 34 (7.7 percent).^{iv} Therefore at present, women legislators' impact upon the outcomes of roll call votes dealing with women's questions may be very limited. But if the number of women in the Duma increases, will they be able to induce policy change in accordance with their particular goals and priorities?

While much of the early empirical research on women and politics worked to counter the image of women as different from men, new research challenges political scientists to think once again about gender difference.^v It is often argued that women as a constituency

group are considerably more important to female elected officials than they are to male elected officials. In a comparative perspective, the political priorities of female legislators are found to differ from or even conflict with those of male legislators.^{vi} Women sponsor more legislation dealing with women's concerns than do their male colleagues.^{vii} Women express greater concern about social policy issues, give higher priority to constituency casework^{viii} and stronger support for issues of women's rights.^{ix} It has been found that women in legislatures with higher percentages of female representation pass more bills pertaining to women's issues than do men in these legislatures.^x

Others argue that greater numbers of women do not necessarily help to override gender-related problems in a legislature.^{xi} Although women legislators can band together to promote shared interests, in many instances gender differences should not be exaggerated. There are a number of claimants for the vote of legislators. In particular, constituency connection is important. To cultivate his or her personal vote that may be essential in the light of reelection goals, a legislator responds to constituency interests regardless of gender.^{xii} Political party, however, has proved to be the most prominent divider among politicians. In a legislature with cohesive political parties, female legislators respond to cues provided from their party when voting on women's issue bill.^{xiii} Thus the stronger party power, the less it is likely that female politicians behave as women's representatives.

In parliamentary systems with disciplined parties female representatives' ability to cross party boundaries to protect women's interests is most problematic. Indeed, majority support in the parliament is essential for keeping the executive in power. The parliament usually accepts bills recommended by the executive as a matter of party loyalty.^{xiv} In presidential systems female legislators are less restricted in their activities. Unlike in parliamentary systems, there is no institutionalised need for party cohesion.^{xv} The impact of parties is less tangible. Therefore, legislators may behave more independently in lawmaking

processes. As a result, American Congresswomen tend to come together across party lines to support bills dealing specifically with women's issues.^{xvi}

In the United States, however, female legislators' involvement into issues dealing with women substantially varies across states^{xvii} although all of them have the same, presidential models of government. This may be explained with reference to the different levels of legislative parties' power. Among the most important factors accounting for strong legislative parties in the states, is the absence of competing centres of power, such as developed committee systems. Strong legislative committees may provide legislators with a better chance of exerting influence than party does. Availability of governmental patronage, greater political homogeneity of the represented territory, and lesser legislative professionalism, also contribute into the cohesiveness of legislative parties.^{xviii} Therefore in the California legislature characterised by higher degree of professionalism and greater amount of resources available, the entire issue of women representation is more salient than in the Arizona legislature. Thus certain institutional norms and political circumstances have the ability to overrule or negate gender-specific assumptions or inclinations regarding leadership and power.^{xix} While regime type provides the general institutional framework within which legislature's internal structure develops, the political and electoral context of the legislature can also shape the structure thus influencing female legislators' autonomy against parties.

An analysis of debates on legislation in the Russian State Duma reveals that women legislators' attitudes towards gender differences serve as a factor which may determine female deputies' policy stances. Irrespective of their party affiliation, women deputies tend to have the common image of the typical woman. It is known, particularly, that women as a constituency group express greater pacifism, nurturance, and compassion for the needy.^{xx} Therefore many female politicians believe that their policy views are to incorporate such values. Non-pacifistic policy stances are perceived by them as an exception or deviation.^{xxi}

When the 1995 Duma debated the federal law aimed at introducing moratoria on the execution of death penalty, some of female deputies opposed to the bill. Their intrinsic ‘image of the ideal woman’ was suppressed but did not disappear. As a proof of this, a woman deputy started her overtly anti-law speech with a significant notion: ‘As a woman I would have been supportive of the bill...’^{xxii}

Motivations which female politicians ascribe to their policy stances are rooted in not only the image of the ‘ideal woman’ but also in ideological allegiances. The gender gap being a manifestation of different perspectives between women and men varies across different types of women’s concerns. In a comparative perspective, the gender of the representative is most significant on votes dealing with women’s health. The influence of gender is overwhelmed by party and ideology on votes that are less directly related to women, such as education.^{xxiii} The prominence of gender also depends on the cohesiveness of party voting that is greater on some issues than on others. Party voting is most cohesive on issues that divide party electorates thus reinforcing the dominant partisan conflict.^{xxiv} Women’s issue bills vary in the degree to which they can be related to the partisan competition. If a bill fits into the partisan conflict, legislative voting on this bill is driven by party rather than gender. But as soon as a bill ceases to match the partisan dimension, voting may be influenced by personal preferences defined by gender.

This study investigates the ability of female deputies to the Duma to address different types of women’s concerns by voting together across party lines. Arguably, female politicians’ mobilisation around women’s issues becomes especially visible when we analyse floor voting rather than other legislative activities. Indeed, ‘women friendly’ attitudes may motivate female deputies to not only vote in favour of women’s concerns but also introduce legislation beneficial to women, participate in respective legislative committees, organise parliamentary hearings devoted to women’s issues, etc. But in practice, female representatives

being overloaded with a variety of issues unrelated to women's concerns, cannot spend much time on the mentioned activities. Legislative voting, in contrast, is a less-demanding criterion of the representation of women's interests because it does not require engaging significant efforts or resources.

Comparative studies have demonstrated that women as a constituency group tend to be sociotropic in their political preferences.^{xxv} Therefore 'women friendly' voting patterns will be analysed in three key policy domains: public welfare issues, social protection for women, and the non-economic issues of life quality (which will be specified in details in the section discussing dependent variables). The chronological scope of the study is 1995-2001. It encompasses the life span of the 1995-1999 Duma, and the first half of the term of the current Duma elected in December 1999. Russia has a system with a strong presidency. The legislature possesses extensive lawmaking powers but it influences government formation to a limited extent only. Since 1993, the general institutional design has remained unchanged, the legislative contexts of the 1995 and 1999 Dumas are substantially different.

It is hypothesised that legislative context and the intensity of the partisan conflict over an issue affect female voting attitudes. This study offers several hypotheses specifying interrelations between the legislative contexts, issue profile, and women legislators' voting patterns. These include:

1. Welfare issues dealing with the society as a whole strongly fit into the partisan conflict. Therefore irrespective of legislative context, women do not band together to support these issues. Rather, women split on ideologically diverse subgroups and vote in accordance with their party's ideology.
2. Women's issues dealing with the domestic space polarise electorates to a lesser extent. The less-partisan legislative context caused by divided government helps women to vote together in favour of such interests. However, as legislative parties

become stronger, they do not allow women to vote solid across party lines. In other words, the impact of issue profile tends to be overwhelmed by the legislative context.

3. The cohesive legislative parties do not determine women's voting on issues that do not match the principal partisan dimension, such as some of the non-material wellbeing concerns. However, if the non-economic issues tap into the partisan conflict, gender differences disappear. Even in the less-partisan legislative context, voting on such issues is determined by party ideology rather than gender.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next two sections I will discuss the legislative contexts of the 1995 and 1999 Dumas. Then the sets of dependent and independent variables employed in the research will be presented. To test my working hypotheses I will perform multiple regression analysis, the results of which will be discussed in the last sections of the study. In the conclusion I will sum up the findings of the research and discuss the prospects of women's representation in the Russian legislature.

The legislative context of the 1995 Duma

The separation of powers system often makes governance problematic. When the President can rely on legislative majority or homogeneous coalition of legislative parties, the co-ordination of legislative and executive decisions becomes more successful. The executives are in position to maximise party appeals while neglecting the legislative opposition's interests. Therefore ideological polarisation flourishes and the parties exhibit the greatest differences in their platforms. As a result, even traditionally less organised legislative parties are able to build party discipline. Indeed, as students of the U.S. Congress have noticed, party power peaks when one party controls both branches of power.^{xxvi} Divided government occurring when a legislative majority is held by a party that is different from the party of the

President, is more difficult to cope with. Then the executive is to follow a mixed strategy: partisan appeals for its own party and non-partisan politics for the opposition that is occasionally cajoled by the executive.^{xxvii} To pursue its policy goals, the executives rely on one occasional cross-party coalition opposing another cross-party coalition. As a result, party lines may not be the best predictors of policy stance.^{xxviii} Inside the legislature, there are conditions for individualistic legislative behaviour.

The Russian State Duma of 1995 represents the case. The Duma elections of 1995 resulted in the victory of the left-wing opposition.^{xxix} The left wing of the Duma represented by the Communist Party (CPRF) and its close allies, the Agrarian Deputy Group (ADG) and deputy group called People's Power (PP), was slightly short of a legislative majority (222 of 450 seats). Our Home is Russia (OHIR), the only Duma party clearly associated with the liberal government, gained as few as 66 seats. Besides OHIR, the non-communist camp included Yabloko, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), deputy group called the Regions of Russia (RR), and independent deputies.^{xxx} Thus in 1995-1999, Russia experienced divided government that was especially difficult to cope with because the party-oriented Duma structure motivated parties^{xxxi} to accentuate their differences. Indeed, legislative parties have become the core element in the Duma's organisation.^{xxxii} The partisan structure was created in the first post-authoritarian Duma of 1993. The executives preferred the party-oriented Duma structure because it allowed them to pursue their policy goals on the floor.^{xxxiii} The pro-president parties representing the dominant political force in the highly fragmented legislature used the partisan rules to permit the President to dominate.

In the 1995 Duma, the pro-president forces became a minority therefore the partisan structure could only facilitate the opposition's struggle against the government. True, Boris Yeltsin, the Russian President of those days, could dissolve the Duma because the Constitution permitted this.^{xxxiv} But insofar as economic decline resulted in the growing

popularity of the opposition, early parliamentary elections would most likely reassert the opposition's success while further reducing the size of the pro-governmental delegation on the floor.^{xxxv} Therefore political if not constitutional factors conditioned the effective separation of powers in 1995-1999. To cope with the situation of divided control, the Russian executives had no choice but to minimise partisan appeal and curry the favour of some legislators of the opposition. Occasionally, the President went as far as to allow a few opposition-leaning politicians to hold some key positions in the government. Given the extensive law-making powers of the Duma, the government was to negotiate policy with the Duma, which tended to limit the ideological distance between the branches of power.^{xxxvi} Indeed, to reach agreement on legislation, the branches of power often saw political issues in technical rather than ideological terms.^{xxxvii}

The inter-branch conflict was more or less successfully managed as the expense of legislative discipline. Among other factors weakening parties, the presence of competing centres of power may be mentioned. To perform its law-making function Duma has a system of strong and specialised committees serving as centrifugal forces that counter the centripetal tendencies of parties. Although Duma committees had become permeable to the influence of parties, many of them were able to become autonomous units.^{xxxviii} The cumulative evidence of party power can be gauged by looking at how Duma deputies behave — in the most visible sense, how they vote on legislation. The average levels of party cohesion calculated on the basis of the roll call voting on key bills and policy issues were the following: 81.0 for factions, 72.0 for deputy groups, and 77.0 for the Duma as a whole.^{xxxix} It may be noticed that factions formed on the basis of strong electoral associations tended to be more cohesive than deputy groups formed by mixing the representatives of small parties with independents. In sum, the data reveal that party discipline existed in the Duma, although the level of party voting was closer to the standards of the American Congress than to those of the British

House of Commons with its traditionally disciplined parliamentary parties.^{xl}

How were women deputies represented in the Duma's organisational structures? In contrast to the previous Duma elected in 1993, women deputies did not form a gender-based faction.^{xli} A CPRF leader, Svetlana Goriacheva, was a Deputy Chair of the 1995 Duma. There were two Duma committees, the Committee on Women, Family, and Youth, and the Committee on Ecology chaired by women.^{xlii} On the one hand, the distribution of committee chairs demonstrated that there was a consensus among male and female deputies regarding 'traditional women's concerns': women's affairs and ecology are amongst them. But on the other hand, the mentioned committees occupy rather low positions in the informal Duma committee hierarchy. Thus the chairmanship distribution both helped women deputies to more efficiently protect women's interests and marginalised them against the male majority that was preoccupied with such matters as budget affairs, economic policies, industry, privatisation, etc., that were widely regarded as 'more important'.

How the 1995-1999 legislative context influenced female legislators' voting attitudes? Being contextually similar to the fragmenting institutions of the American government, Russia's divided government engendered individualistic incentives driving legislative voting although the impact of parties did not wither away. Whether legislative voting is determined by party or gender, depends on the extent to which a bill can be related to the dominant political conflict. It may be expected that with respect to issues that tap into the left-right dimension and polarise party electorates, legislative party ideology remains the major driving force of legislative voting. Additionally, a party's position towards the government may be also of importance. The impact of the less-partisan Duma conditions becomes tangible when legislators vote on issues that do not sharply divide electorates thus reducing the prominence of the partisan conflict. Then gender may play a significant role in determining a legislator's vote on this sort of issues.

The 1999 Duma: flows of party voting

The 1999 Duma elections were held in the period when Yeltsin's successor, Vladimir Putin, had been experiencing an impetuous increase in popularity. On this wave, a new overtly pro-governmental electoral association called Unity emerged as the second-runner in the races and formed the core of the pro-presidential legislative coalition. The coalition has been also joined by a satellite deputy group, People's Deputy (PD), the Fatherland – All Russia (FAR) faction,^{xliii} and the Regions of Russia (RR) deputy group. The LDPR occasionally joins the pro-presidential camp as well. Thus overall, the pro-governmental camp has 251 Duma seats. Opposition profiles are retained by the communists and the ADG successor group, the Agro-Industrial Group (AIDG), who jointly control 130 seats,^{xliv} by Yabloko and, less consistently, by the Union of Right Forces (URF).

Thus President Putin's government is buttressed by a legislative majority. The model of inter-branch relations that existed in 1995-1999 has changed. At present, the executive can afford to maximise partisan appeals and disregard the interests of the opposition or of those legislative parties that are considered as situational opponents. An acute conflict over Duma committee distribution when Unity and CPRF violated the 'package deal' existing in the previous Dumas, and captured disproportionately large shares of committees, has demonstrated that policy is made not by cross-party coalitions (as it often was in the 1995 Duma) but rather by occasional coalitions of different parties. In order to be considered as a prospective coalition partner, a legislative party is to maintain its cohesion. Members of the pro-presidential camp and especially those of Unity are aware that their standing requires higher legislative discipline. Indeed, since the President controls both the branches of power, responsibility for policy is much clearer than ever previously. These legislators know that if they make the President look bad, to significant extent they also make themselves and their

party look bad. Hence the tendency to rally around the President on important votes, often at the expense of the legislators' own preferences.^{xlv} The surprisingly smooth passage of the overtly neo-liberal 2002 Federal Budget serves as a proof of this observation.

Several other important factors also facilitate party power in the 1999 Duma. The weakness of competing centres of power, particularly, committees provides for strong legislative parties.^{xlvi} The mentioned committee reconfiguration means that Duma legislators are frequently assigned to committees different from those to which they were assigned in the previous Duma. This undermines the accumulation of personal expertise on policies and, hence, personal resources enabling deputies to counter party's impact. Second, greater political homogeneity of the Russian society that emerged as a consequence of Putin's overwhelming popularity produces legislative parties in which ranges of differences are smaller and in which there are fewer sources of internal conflict.^{xlvii} Finally, only a few members of the pro-presidential coalition and as few as two Unity representatives are reelected incumbents. Therefore the coalition possesses lesser legislative professionalism, and its members are less able to operate independently of party leaders. As a result, in the 1999 Duma party voting is more cohesive than in the previous Duma. The averages of cohesion for factions, deputy groups, and the Duma as a whole are 85.0, 77.0, and 82.0, respectively.^{xlviii} Thus although Russia's institutional design has not changed, the current Duma's context resembles parliamentary systems in that party is the strongest divider among politicians.

What is the role of women in the 1999 Duma's legislative process? As it has been already mentioned, in the current Duma, the overall female representation dropped. But in contrast to the previous Duma, women deputies are more widely represented in the legislature's steering body and organisational structures. Liubov' Sliska, a Unity member, is the First Deputy Chair of the Duma, while Irina Khakamada, a leader of the URF, is one of the Deputy Chairs of the legislature. Women chair three committees: the Committee on

Women, Family, and Youth, the Committee on the Problems of the North and Far East, and the Committee on Ethics. As it was in the 1995 Duma, the committee distribution both reflects Duma legislators' stereotypes concerning the legislative women deputies, and marginalises female politicians. Indeed, the Committee on Women, and the Committee on the Problems of the North and Far East, were least popular among Duma legislators: as few as six of them initially decided to participate in each of the committees. To compare, the Committee on Budget Affairs and Taxes was preferred by fifty-one deputies.^{xlix}

Thus one cannot expect that female legislators become more sensitive to women's interests due to their greater representation in the Duma leadership. Party ideology is expected to affect voting on bills fitting into the partisan dimension much stronger than in the 1995 Duma. Now legislators disregard the extent to which a bill divides party electorates. Even if a bill does not substantially polarise electorates, legislators obediently respond to ideological cues provided by their party when voting on this bill. This reduces female legislators' ability to cross party boundaries to vote solid in favour of policies beneficial to women. Gender can play a role in determining a legislator's vote only if a bill cannot be related to the dominant partisan dimension at all.

Legislation concerning women: the set of dependent variables

The first dependent variable is an index of roll call votes on welfare issue bills.^l This domain includes such issues as programmes of social security, protection for pensioners, subsidies to low-paid social groups, unemployment compensations, aid to agriculture, etc. These issues clearly fit into the partisan conflict. Comparative studies have demonstrated that gender is significantly associated with the priority given to social policy issues.^{li} The construction of the index includes two steps. First, Duma deputies' votes on each of the bills are ascribed dummy values: left-wing and right-wing positions are coded as 1 and 0,

respectively. If a deputy abstained from voting on a given issue or preferred to do not vote while attending the session, this position is coded as 0.5. Second, the average of these values is calculated for each legislator. To compare voting results for the 1995 and 1999 Dumas, two different sets of such indexes are calculated. The total numbers of bills analysed for each of the Dumas are eighteen and sixteen,^{lii} respectively. Some of these bills have been already adopted by the legislature, while others entered the first- or second-reading stages on the floor. In each particular case, the available data on the bills' latest considerations are used. I analyse roll call votes for different periods of the Dumas' term rather for one particular session. For the 1995 Duma, only legislators who voted on at least fifteen out of eighteen bills are included in the study. For the 1999 Duma, I include only those legislators who voted on at least thirteen out of sixteen bills.

With women serving as the caretakers of the home, children and family matters are traditionally considered as women's issues.^{liii} Therefore the second dependent variable is an index of roll call votes on the domestic women's issues, such as child care and child support, benefits to citizens with children, pregnancy benefits and pregnancy leave, reduced taxes for families having many children, domestic violence, equal rights for women and men having family, etc. The domestic issue bills also fit into the partisan dimension since all of them deal with social protection measures. At the same time, these issues tend to divide party electorates to a lesser extent. Paternalistic expectations regarding protection for family, remain strong even among those constituents who are liberal-minded in other respects. An index of roll call votes on the domestic issues is constructed similarly to the first dependent variable. Positions supportive of and opposing to protection for women in the domestic space are coded 1 and 0, respectively. The total numbers of bills analysed for the 1995 and 1999 Dumas are fifteen and eleven,^{liv} respectively. The votes of only those legislators who voted on at least twelve out of fifteen bills and nine out of eleven bills, respectively, are examined in the study.

The next two dependent variables relate to the non-material aspects of life. While the Duma has been strongly involved into issues dealing with material protection for the society, issues pertaining to the non-economic quality of life attract little attention. There are especially few bills with such profiles that are related specifically to women's agenda. Some of these bills match a partisan dimension while others do not. To make the impacts of the varying legislative contexts and issue profiles upon legislative voting more salient, for the 1995 and 1999 Dumas I select two partisan and two non-partisan bills, respectively. For the 1995 Duma, the selected bills are aimed at protecting citizens' moral health through enhancing control over the circulation of pornographic materials. Issues relating to pornography have become a part of women's policy agenda. In a comparative perspective, the proponents of the anti-pornography position intend to channel legal power against agents of pornography who have caused harm to the society through the involvement of not only women but also children with pornographic materials.^{lv} The current status of Russian women is lowered by the manner in which pornography, rape and violence against women have been publicised, propagandising an image of women as sex objects.^{lvi} According to public opinion survey results, Russian women hold less tolerant attitudes towards pornography than do men^{lvii} therefore strict control over the circulation of pornographic materials corresponds to women's interests. The pro-censorship position is ascribed value 1. From an opposite perspective, legal power cannot be used to protect public morality. This position is coded 0. An index of roll call vote on the morality issue is constructed similarly to the previous dependent variables. Only those deputies who voted on both bills are included in the research.

The last dependent variable pertains to the environmental health of the society. Serving as caregivers in the society, women tend to give higher priority to the ecological aspects of life quality. From the feminist perspective, there is a link between the violation of nature and marginalisation of women. The very patriarchal power that has brought countless

instances of private suffering also causes severe ecological problems.^{lviii} In a comparative perspective, female deputies who often perceive support from environmentalists as a constituency group,^{lix} give hither priority to environmental issues.^{lx} Such concerns, however, do not permeate the 1999 Duma's atmosphere: in 2001 the legislature adopted two anti-environmental bills permitting the import of the nuclear waste of other countries for reprocessing and permanent storage. Votes for and against these bills are assigned dummy values 0 and 1, respectively. An index of roll call votes is constructed similarly to the previous variables. Only legislators who voted on both bills are included in the study.

Independent variables of the study

There are four independent variables in the study. The first variable is gender of a legislator. It is coded 1 for females and 0 for males. It is expected that the impact of gender upon legislative voting on the public welfare bills, is overwhelmed by party. Given the less-partisan context of the 1995 Duma, gender can play a role in determining a legislator's vote on the traditional women's issues. In the 1999 Duma, such a tendency will hardly be observed. With respect to morality issues, female deputies in the 1995 Duma are unlikely to vote together across party lines. In the 1999 Duma, female legislators can band together to promote the ecological health of the society despite party constraints.

Unfortunately, the small number of Duma women does not allow to statistically investigate the diversity of political differences among women. To cope with this problem, I introduce the control variable that reflects the effect of constituency connection. Constituency preferences can substantially influence legislative voting.^{lxi} At the same time, there is an inverse relationship between party power and local influences. In this particular sense, the impact of constituency is similar to that of gender: it may appear if party power declines. Therefore if constituency ties do influence legislative voting, women legislators may cross

party boundaries. If women do not band together, then it may be so that they split on ideologically diverse subgroups that do not have a uniform position on an issue.

One of most important bases of legislators' constituency support is ideological congruence between representatives' attitudes and constituents' political preferences.^{lxii} However, the majority of Russian citizens are weakly attached to political parties. The high level of volatility in voting behaviour confirms this contention.^{lxiii} The only political party that enjoys relatively stable electoral support is the CPRF.^{lxiv} Therefore to measure the impact of constituency connection I use the share of the votes gained by the CPRF in a region in the 1995 and 1999 Duma elections by party lists. In Russia, a half of the 450 Duma deputies is elected on the basis of simple plurality in 225 single-member districts and another half is elected by proportional representation in a single nation-wide district. The distribution of proportional seats in the single nation-wide district tends to suppress constituency ties.^{lxv} Legislators elected by the federal party lists tend to behave as representatives of the country as a whole rather than particular locality. Therefore list deputies are assigned the shares of the votes gained by the CPRF in the federal district: 22.3 and 24.3 percents in the 1995 and 1999 Duma elections, respectively. Legislators elected in constituencies are ascribed the shares of the vote received by the CPRF not in the given constituency but in the region as a whole. This reduces the distorting effects of candidates' personal popularity. The degrees and directions of the variable's impact upon legislative voting will be established empirically.

The next independent variables are those factors that counter the impacts of gender and constituency upon legislative voting. One of these variables is legislative party ideology. For the 1995 Duma, it is coded 1 for the left-wing parties (CPRF, ADG, and PP) and 0 for the rest Duma parties including independents who mostly represented minor liberal parties. For the 1999 Duma, value 1 is assigned to the CPRF and AIDG, while the other parties' ideology is coded 0. The same value is ascribed to the independent legislators. It is expected that

women's issue bills pertaining to family matters are likely to be supported by the leftist legislative parties. Insofar as they stand for social-protectionist economy and centralised control over distributive policies, they also promote state protection for women, particularly, working mothers. Women's goals dealing with morality tap into the partisan dimension because the same transitional reforms that allows freedom to express speech, including sexual speech allows economic liberalisation. The left-wing ideology in Russia incorporates not only state patronage but also moral traditionalism.^{lxvi} Those women's issues that emerged as a consequence of Russia's liberalisation are considered as deeply alien to the country's conservative moral traditions. Therefore bills aimed at moral health protection are likely to be opposed by the communists. The right-wing parties advocate market economy and limited state protectionism.^{lxvii} Therefore these parties' goals contradict to the women's interests coalesced around children and family matters. In contrast to the communists, right-wing politicians consider the pornography problem as unavoidable consequence of pluralist morality and stand for the legal control over the problem.

Party positions towards the import of the nuclear waste in Russia are more problematic. On the one hand, no party can deny that money paid for the import of the nuclear waste may substantially contribute into the state budget. But on the other hand, it is realised that the storage of the radioactive waste can further aggravate the already alarming ecological situation in Russia. This problem is especially challenging for the communists. The import of the nuclear waste allows for creating new job positions, reducing unemployment rate, and, finally, getting money for a variety social programmes. But at the same time, the communists' patriotic feelings are touched on the raw by the fact that Russia becomes a world dustbin. In sum, it may be expected that the conflict over the ecological issue crystallises along cross-party rather than inter-party lines.

The last independent variable is a link between a legislative party and the government,

that is, the partisanship of government officials. While the Duma does not take part in the formation of the government, members of pro-presidential parties are often appointed to government positions, which creates what will be further referred to as ‘government linkage’.^{lxviii} This variable is coded 1 for OHIR and Unity members, and 0 for the rest legislators. With respect to the social welfare bills, the members of the right-wing pro-presidential parties are likely to share with the government its liberal policy agenda. Women’s issues relating to family tend to polarise the legislature to a lesser extent. In the 1995 Duma, the government’s negative position towards many of these protectionist bills could be neglected even by OHIR members. In the 1999 Duma, the government’s opinion regarding these issues may be taken into account by Unity members more seriously. Arguably, the governmental linkage impact upon the different types of the non-economic issues varies. The government’s open support for the bills aimed at protecting morality could escalate partisan conflict in the Duma that did not correspond to the executives’ strategic goals. Therefore it cannot be expected that the government linkage substantially influences legislators’ vote on these bills. Since 1999, the executives are in position to pursue its policy goals. Insofar as the executives were very interested in the passage of the anti-environmental bills, it may be predicted that interlocking relation with the government is a tangible factor affecting legislative voting on these bills.

Findings: women’s vote in the 1995 Duma

The goal of this section is to statistically investigate whether female representatives in the Duma are more supportive of women’s issues than are their male colleagues. Table 1 presents the results of the regression analysis of factors affecting legislative support for the different categories of bills. Model 1 shows that party ideology is the major driving force of the vote on the public welfare issues. The government linkage variable affects the legislative

voting to a significant but relatively lesser extent. OHIR's inability to substantially influence policy outcomes often motivated the party's members to deflect from the government's policy line. Moreover, many of OHIR members were individually resourceful local politicians, who were less inclined to obey to party discipline.^{lxxix} The impact of local political preferences is insignificant by the conventional statistical standards. Nevertheless, the beta-coefficient is still less than its standard error therefore at least some of legislators do take constituency preferences into account. The less-partisan Duma context allowed them to do that. At the same time, the effect of gender on voting on the welfare issues is far from any standards of statistical significance. Hence there is no uniform women's position on the welfare issues. Rather, different subgroups of women display varying voting attitudes. These attitudes are determined by not only party (the impact of which is not especially strong) but also by women's personal ideological priorities. Some scholars argue that women are more left-wing than men.^{lxxx} My findings, however, indicate that partisanship positively affects legislative voting for both females and males.^{lxxxi}

Do female legislators in the Duma address women's concerns in the domestic sphere? In the Russian context, the traditional women's concerns are policy questions that tend to unify party electorates thus reducing the intensity of the partisan conflict.^{lxxxii} Indeed, these issues touch interests of not only women representing roughly a half of the country population but also their children and families. Therefore women's issue bills mean a great deal in terms of both their social impact and the evaluation of legislators' performance. As follows from Model 2, although party ideology substantially influences legislative voting on the domestic concerns, its impact is not as strong as in the case of the vote on the public welfare issues. The results reveal that the left-wing legislative parties appear to be most supportive of these female issues. In other words, the protection of the traditional women's interests strongly depends upon the legislative representation of the left-wing parties.

At the same time, the statistical results show that female legislators support the ‘women friendly’ policies irrespective of their party’s ideology. There is statistical evidence confirming that gender is modifying the effect of party on legislative voting on the domestic female issues. The 1995 Duma’s less-partisan context engendering centrifugal tendencies did allow female legislators to transcend party boundaries to view women as a specific constituency whose needs are to be responded. Even the right-wing women downplay their ideological preferences to address the paternalist expectations regarding family protection. An analysis of debates on legislation in the Duma confirms this contention. For instance, female deputies from both left-wing and right-wing parties expressed equally negative opinions on amendments to the federal law on state benefits for pregnant women that, in fact, violated women’s rights. Male deputies, in contrast, tended to discuss the bill in partisan terms.^{lxxiii}

Table 1. Determinants of legislative voting in the 1995 Duma

Independent variables	Model 1 / public welfare issues	Model 2 / traditional women’s issues	Model 3 / morality protection issues
Gender	0.004 (0.015)	0.035** (0.015)	—0.01 (0.04)
Party ideology	0.25*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)	—0.38*** (0.03)
Government linkage	—0.20*** (0.01)	—0.02* (0.01)	0.04 (0.04)
Constituency connection	0.001 (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.004** (0.002)
Intercept	0.65*** (0.02)	0.73*** (0.02)	0.77*** (0.05)
Number of cases	414	413	413
Adjusted R-squared	0.78	0.43	0.38

Note: OLS regression analysis with unstandardised beta coefficients. Standard errors are in the parentheses.

*** = sig p. 0.00; ** = sig p. 0.05; * = sig p. 0.1

Similarly to many women politicians, female deputies to the Duma give higher priority to constituency needs.^{lxxiv} Duma women's responsiveness to the local concerns is facilitated by these legislators' greater personal resourcefulness. Whether a representative is able to resist to party pressure or not, depends on the amount of political resources acquired by him or her at the time of entrance to the legislative floor. To be elected, a female candidate is often to display substantial electoral superiority over her male rivals. Thus very unequal electoral conditions serve as a filter for the most politically experienced and resourceful women.^{lxxv} As a result, women legislators tend to behave more independently than do their male colleagues.^{lxxvi}

Under the conditions of divided government, the majority of Duma legislators can respond to local political preferences despite the governments' policy goals. As the statistical results show, constituency connection exerts a tangible impact upon legislative voting on the traditional women's concerns. If the CPRF enjoys electoral support in a region, legislators representing this region support programmes of protection for women regardless of their own ideological preferences. Even OHIR members occasionally avoided subjecting themselves to the executives' anti-protectionist instructions: the moderate statistical significance of the government linkage variable is evident in this respect. Legislators' attention to constituency political preferences may be explained with reference to not only divided government but also incumbents' reelection goals. The pre-1999 electoral contests revealed that only CPRF has been electorally safe by the virtue of its mass popularity. Therefore competition for positions on the CPRF list was very intense that undoubtedly contributed into the party's legislative cohesion. Non-leftist incumbents seeking reelection could not especially rely on their parties because the right-wing electoral niche was very fragmented and unstable.^{lxxvii} Hence these legislators had to establish and maintain their own constituency ties. This stimulated constituency-oriented voting at least on bills that touch the interests of a large share of

population, such as women's questions. Thus the desire to achieve constituents' approval through greater attention to women's interests comes as a consequence of the unstable Russian party system.

Model 3 of Table 1 reveals that the bills dealing with morality protection did bitterly divide the 1995 Duma. Party ideology is the best predictor of legislative voting on these issues. While the right-wing parties were strongly supportive of the bills, the communist opposition was opposed even placing them on the legislative agenda. The communists' ideological shift towards an explicitly nationalist ideological standing^{lxxviii} reinforces their hostility towards liberalisation and its consequences. From the left-wing perspective, the adoption of these bills recognises the moral traditionalism' decay and legitimises the pluralisation of the society. Therefore the communists tend to see these issues in extremely partisan terms and use the debates to severely criticise the liberal government. The statistical results show that constituency connection substantially influences legislative voting on the moral issues. At the same time, the results reveal a tricky tendency: the higher the local support of the CPRF, the more it is likely that the region's representatives support these bills. To account for this finding, it may be noticed that economics feed into Russians' electoral behaviour.^{lxxix} To a certain extent, the support of the CPRF is justified with reference to bad economic conditions in a region.^{lxxx} The poorer management of the regional economy, the more it is likely that the censorship problem is perceived as one of the most important. As a CPRF male representative supportive of the bills puts this, 'thousands of people are forced to work in the evenings, work in additional jobs, while their neglected children watch television. But you prefer to stand for supreme morality and do nothing to at least partly eliminate this disgrace'.^{lxxxi} Thus some of the communists realised that their party's moral traditionalism conflicted with constituents' interests. The less-partisan legislative context allowed legislators to take into account not only their party's ideological position but also constituency needs

even if these factors contradicted each other.

While constituency connection proves to be an influential factor affecting voting attitudes, gender plays no role in determining a legislator's position. In other words, there is an ideological conflict between different subgroups of women. Many (but not all) of the left-wing women are similar to their male counterparts in their traditionalist moral attitudes and hostility towards liberalisation. It cannot be said that the left-wing women readily disregard women's interests. But they tended to understand these interests in the terms of the left-wing ideology that cannot be positive towards such liberal bills. As an ADG female legislator argued, 'today in our country there is no circulation of these [pornographic] materials; as soon as the bill will be adopted, we will introduce the circulation'.^{lxxxii} Another left-wing women, a member of the CPRF, insisted that 'the true reason [of pornography] is the unruliness of glasnost', the propaganda of depravity ... with the direct participation of the authorities'.^{lxxxiii} At the same time, another female member of the CPRF not only strongly supported the bills but also actively sponsored them.

The history of the passage of these bills reveals that the executives were not particularly concerned with the problem. In general, non-economic female concerns tend to be omitted from both the legislative and executive policy agendas. These bills were introduced by a group of Duma legislators rather than the government. After the first-reading procedure the President expressed his disagreement with the bill concept, yet the executive did not intervene into Duma debates on the bills. Although the bills' liberal profile corresponds to the government's policy priorities, the executives avoid conflicting with the Duma over non-economic issues, which are generally considered as less important. Indeed, my statistical results show that the government ties do not substantially influence legislative voting on these bills. The beta-coefficient for the government linkage variable does not gain statistical significance even though its sign is in correct direction.

In sum, although the less-partisan 1995 Duma context facilitated the active representation of women, the level of female politicians' commitment to the representation of women depended on issue profile. Such policy questions as public welfare and morality protection, bitterly divided female deputies on different subgroups. Issues dealing with children and family matters tended to downplay partisan preferences. Women banded together to vote in favour of these interests irrespective of their party ideology.

Findings: women's vote in the 1999 Duma

Can the 1999 Duma's females address women's interests? Table 2 presents the results of the regression analysis of factors influencing legislative voting on the varying types of bills. Model 1 illustrates the influx of party voting that are engendered by the homogeneous legislative and executive majorities. The results confirm that party ideology is the strongest predictor of legislative voting on the public welfare issues. The government linkage is also a significant indicator of how the legislators in this study voted on the welfare bills. Comparing with the 1995 Duma, the impacts of both variables become much stronger. At the same time, the impact of constituency absolutely withers away. Thus there is no room for Duma women's individualistic behaviour, indeed. The statistical results demonstrate that gender does not influence legislative voting on the welfare issues. Even if women could develop a common position on welfare issues, party would definitely suppress gender differences in legislative voting.

Given that the amount of party voting approaches the levels more characteristic of parliamentary systems than presidential ones, it is unlikely that gender can play a role in determining voting on the traditional women's issue bills. Indeed, the statistical results of Model 2 reveal that female legislators do not transcend party boundaries to vote in favour of women's domestic interests. Indeed, women's greater personal resourcefulness can facilitate

individualistic legislative behaviour. But the impact of personal resources may appear only if contextual stimuli for party cohesion are weak. The 1999 Duma does not represent the case. True, party discipline may run low over the traditional women's concerns that tend to unify electorates although still match the left-right partisan dimension. Constituents' paternalist expectations regarding protection for family can be taken into account by legislators only if party discipline is not especially binding. If legislative context stimulates party power, the influence of local interests is overwhelmed by party. The statistical results show that in contrast to the previous Duma, in the current legislature constituents' political preferences are disregarded by legislators when they vote on women's issue bills.

Table 2. Determinants of legislative voting in the 1999 Duma

Independent variables	Model 1 / public welfare issues	Model 2 / traditional women's issues	Model 3 / ecology protection issues
Gender	0.009 (0.014)	—0.001 (0.015)	0.19** (0.07)
Party ideology	0.38*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	—0.07 (0.05)
Government linkage	—0.33*** (0.01)	—0.04*** (0.01)	—0.39*** (0.05)
Constituency connection	—0.000 (0.001)	—0.001 (0.001)	0.005 (0.004)
Intercept	0.44*** (0.02)	0.87*** (0.02)	0.32*** (0.09)
Number of cases	431	431	431
Adjusted R-squared	0.91	0.17	0.12

Note: OLS regression analysis with unstandardised beta coefficients. Standard errors are in the parentheses.

*** = sig p. 0.00; ** = sig p. 0.05; * = sig p. 0.1

The specificity of the electoral context also contributes into this tendency. At present,

constituency support is no longer considered as a social base from which legislators can oppose to their party. Party loyalty matters for prospective reelection strategies much more than local support. In the past, only left-wing incumbents were particularly interested in displaying the party-oriented legislative behaviour because they could gain a place in the electorally ‘safe’ CPRF’s list or at least rely on the party’s organisational support in the constituency races. Since 1999, the right-wing electoral niche is occupied by the electorally strong party, Unity that will most likely achieve substantial electoral success in the next Duma elections.^{lxxxiv} This pushes the right-wing incumbents desiring to be included into the party list towards the party-oriented voting. Therefore the concerns of female constituents cease to affect roll call voting.

Thus these findings suggest that women do not make a difference in the 1999 Duma. Strong party discipline minimises the level of females’ commitment to the representation of women’s interests. But as soon as policy issues cease to fit into the one-dimensional left-right space, picture changes drastically. The statistical results of Model 3 show that party ideology does not influence legislative voting on the environmental bills. Indeed, Duma debates on these issues demonstrated that while some of the right-wing parties including the URF and Yabloko were against the import of the nuclear waste in Russia, Unity and its allies were strongly in favour of the shipment of such waste. Unity’s position was also supported by the communists: the direction of the sign of the coefficient for party ideology variable indicates that the left-wing parties tend to be supportive of the anti-environmental bills. In the West, environmentalists share many of the conventional left’s economic positions.^{lxxxv} But in Russia’s context, the leftist forces do not promote the environmentalist policy agenda. The very emergence of ecology parties in the West demonstrated the existence of new political conflicts that no longer arise in areas of material reproduction. These ‘post-materialist’ values, however, can influence decision-making only in economically affluent countries,^{lxxxvi} and

Russia is not one of them. Therefore the Duma was more concerned with the traditional questions of economic and social security than with ecological matters.

The results indicate that the crucial role in determining legislators' position regarding these bills is played by government linkage. Since the President controls both branches of power, he is able to pursue his policy goals in spite of both representatives' legislative preferences and negative evaluations of the anti-environmental policies in the society.^{lxxxvii} Unity members clearly rally around the President and his government on these votes. The lack of ideological cohesion regarding these issues enhances the importance of other claimants for the vote of legislators, such as constituency ties. Although the constituency variable does not gain statistical significance, the beta-coefficient is still less than its standard error. Therefore at least some of legislators respond to constituents' political preferences. The sign's direction indicates that the high level of the CPRF's support tends to be associated with legislative voting against these bills. Although the CPRF leadership may consider the import of the nuclear waste as a means of improving of local social and economic conditions, many legislators do not believe in the advantages of the waste's storage. Quite the reverse, poor regions are unable to manage the nuclear waste in an appropriate way. Therefore the waste import can lead to an environmental and health catastrophe.

Insofar as different Duma camps fail to reach an ideological consensus regarding these issues, female deputies are able to transcend party boundaries to vote against the anti-environmental policies. The statistical results confirm that gender strongly influences legislative voting on these issues. Thus similar to many women politicians around the world, female deputies to the Duma tend to be in the vanguard of the nuclear safety movement.^{lxxxviii} The questions of the non-economic quality of life cannot gain substantial political support in Russia till the country is experiencing economic hardship. But even in such unfavourable conditions the Duma's female minority has become a specific political group able to give

priority to the environmental issues. The political implications of this finding are of crucial importance. It may be plausibly speculated that if the share of female representatives in the Duma would be greater, these anti-environmental bills would face much stronger opposition on the floor.

In sum, the strong partisan context of the 1999 Duma does not allow females to place a greater stress on their role as representatives of women's concerns in the domestic space let alone welfare issues. At the same time, gender plays an important role in determining a legislator's vote on issues that do not tap into the partisan dimension, such as the environmental health of the society.

Conclusion

The goal of this study was to investigate whether female legislators in the 1995 and 1999 Dumas tend to vote together across party lines to support policies beneficial to women. For this end, I analysed roll call votes on three key policy domains: public welfare issues, traditional women's concerns, and non-economic issues of life quality. In a comparative perspective, female politicians give greater priority than do males to issues related to women's roles as caregivers in the family and in society more generally.^{lxxxix} However, this study shows that female politicians' commitment to the representation of women's interests is determined by two key factors: legislative context and the intensity of partisan conflict over an issue.

The specificity of the 1995 Duma's legislative context was defined by divided government. Although the impact of parties upon legislative vote did not wither away, women politicians were relatively independent in their voting preferences. Therefore the voting records allow us to judge about female legislators' attitudes towards different types of women's concerns. It has been shown that with respect to public welfare and morality

protection issues, there is no uniform position characteristic of Duma women as a whole. Rather, women are divided on ideologically diverse subgroups. While some females support protectionist policies, the others subscribe to a more liberal position on welfare issues. The right-wing women stand for the legal protection of moral health but the leftist conservative females deny the very possibility to discuss such matters on the floor. Therefore the future of legislation on these issues is determined by the left-wing and right-wing parties, respectively, rather than by female legislators, who do not have a uniform position on these issues. With respect to these issues, there is no gender gap between males and females, hence, an increase in women representation will make no policy difference.

However, in the less-partisan legislative context, the level of women representation matters for protection of women in the domestic space. It is found that legislative voting on the traditional women's issues dealing with family and children is substantially influenced by a legislator's gender. Now females from different legislative parties become an interest group with shared goals. This happens because the family issues match the partisan dimension to a lesser extent. One can notice that insofar as the traditional women's policy goals intertwine with the policy priorities of the leftist parties, which are widely presented on the floor, the argument for electing more women loses its ground. However, in spite of the leftist parties' consistent support of the traditional women's concerns, this policy area remains under-addressed. The small number of women's issue bills introduced in and adopted by both the Dumas is evident in this respect. The women's limited numbers in the Duma did not permit women's attitudes to permeate the wider legislative atmosphere. The male majority, who could not be educated about the importance of legislative actions in this policy area,^{xc} sponsors few bills pertaining to women's issues. At the same time, the female minority is to address a wide range of issues unrelated to gender. Arguably, as soon as Duma women become more numerous, they will be less loaded with such issues and introduce more bills

dealing with the issues of women, children, and families.

If party power climbs, as it happens in the 1999 Duma, female legislators are to counter their original support for women's traditional issues and vote in accordance with their party ideology. Legislators are subjected to party discipline that wipes the gender gap out. Irrespective of the size of women's delegation on the floor, females make no policy difference. However, gender plays a substantial role in determining a legislator's vote on bills that cease to tap into the partisan dimension, such as ecology issues. The study shows that women transcend party boundaries to protect the environmental health of the public space. In sum, the comparative analysis reveals that there are at least two policy domains that may catalyse gender gap in legislative voting: protection for family and nuclear safety. In the conditions of under-representation, Duma women might become a 'token minority' that is trying to distance itself from any activity that might accentuate gender differences.^{xcii} However, the small delegation of female legislators in the Duma still can vote in favour of women's goals — at least on those issues that fit into the partisan competition to more or less limited extent. Thus my findings support an opinion expressed by Mark Considine and Iva Ellen Deutchman^{xciii} who argue that 'there is no necessary magic in numbers. Institutions develop rules, incentives and roles, which create highly complex systems for regulating behaviour'.

Obviously, Russia's presidentialism exerts mutually contradicting effects upon women's political representation. Strong presidency undermines the development of political parties and facilitates party system fragmentation. The President and his government did try to provide strong legislative backing but their party building efforts have been generally unsuccessful till the end of 90th. Weak political parties cannot afford to pursue ticket-balancing strategies by nominating more women.^{xciii} Hence the limited number of female legislators in the Duma. At the same time, the dual legitimacy of the President and Duma can

result in divided government that reduces party power and helps women's issues become more salient on the floor. But a small female delegation cannot substantially influence policy-making processes. In 1999, the executives finally succeeded in rallying a loyal legislative majority. At present, the government tries to encourage the development of a less-fragmented party system consisting of few stronger parties. Most likely, stronger parties will be more supportive of ticket-balancing strategies therefore women may become more numerous in the Duma. But as this study shows, the strong partisan structure tends to erase gender differences in legislative behaviour. Whether the election of more women will make more than just a symbolic difference, or not, will depend on women politicians' ability to override the barriers imposed by the unfriendly legislative context.

In general, my study reveals the relative weakness of gender as a claimant for the vote of female legislators. Besides variations in the legislative contexts and issue profiles, this finding may be also explained with reference to the absence of unified positions on women's issues on the grass root level. The Russian women's movement is as deeply divided as the Russian society, which experiences crisis of norms, values, and social organisation as a whole. Throughout the 1990s, feminist organisations in Moscow and St. Petersburg have been perceived by grass root provincial women as arrogant theorists alien to their basic concerns.^{xciv} Under these conditions, the ability of the uncoordinated female constituents to exert pressure on women deputies has been extremely limited. As Rosalind Marsh notices, unless women unify to promote a common political agenda, women's issues will continue to be afforded very low priority by the post-communist governments.^{xcv} And by women politicians themselves, I would add.

NOTES

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1. Sue Bridger et al., *No More Heroines? Russia, Women, and the Market* (London, Routledge, 1996).

2. In the Russian Duma, there are several types of legislative voting. Voting may be either secret (*tainoe*), or open (*otkrytoe*); within the latter category, there is a subcategory of nominal voting (*poimennoe golosovanie*), which means that voting results by name have to be included into session records that are published in the official Duma periodicals. Otherwise, voting results are not included into session records but deputies are entitled to officially request these results and to make them accessible to wider audience. Duma legislators themselves define the type of voting. In this study, both types of open voting are jointly referred to as ‘roll call votes’.

3. Mary Buckley (ed.), *Perestroika and Soviet Women* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992).

4. The representation of women in the 1995 Duma by parliamentary party: CPRF – 17; OHIR – 5; Yabloko – 6; LDPR – 1; RR – 5; PP – 6; ADG – 3; Independents – 3. Source: *Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy 1995. Electoral'naia statistika* (Moskva, Ves' Mir, 1996), pp. 237-240. Women representation in the 1999 Duma: CPRF – 8; Unity – 7; FAR – 4;

URF – 4; Yabloko – 2; LDPR – 0; RR – 3; PD – 3; AIDG – 3; Independents – 0. Internet Source: <http://www.cityline.ru/politika/>.

5. Susan J. Carroll and Linda M. G. Zerilli, 'Feminist Challenges to Political Science', in Ada W. Finifter (ed.), *Political Science: The State of the Discipline II* (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1993), p. 67.

6. Gun Hedlund, 'Women's Interests in Local Politics', in Kathleen B. Jones and Anna G. Jonasdottir (eds.), *The Political Interests of Women: Developing Theory and Research with a Feminist Face* (London, Sage Publications, 1998); Debra L. Dodson et al., *Voices, Views, Votes: The Impact of Women in the 103rd Congress* (New Brunswick, NJ, Centre for the American Women and Politics, 1995); Susan J. Carroll, Debra L. Dodson & Ruth B. Mandel, *The Impact of Women in Public Office: An Overview* (New Brunswick, NJ, Centre for the American Women and Politics, 1991); Sue Thomas, *How Women Legislate* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1994).

7. Michelle A. Saint-Germain, 'Does Their Difference Make a Difference? The Impact of Women on Public Policy in the Arizona Legislature', *Social Science Quarterly*, 70, 4, 1989, pp. 956-968.

8. Norris, Pippa, 'Women Politicians: Transforming Westminster?', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 49, 1, 1996, pp. 98-101.

9. Michele L. Swers, 'Are Women More Likely to Vote for Women's Issue Bills Than Their Male Colleagues?', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 23, 3, 1998, pp. 435-448; Elizabeth A. Segal & Stephanie Brzuzy, 'Gender and Congressional Voting: A Legislative Analysis', *Journal of Women & Social Work*, 10, 1, 1995, pp. 8-23; Thomas, *How Women Legislate*, pp. 63-65.

10. Sue Thomas, 'The Impact of Women on State Legislative Policies', *Journal of Politics*, 53, 4, 1991, pp. 958-976.

11. Mark Considine & Iva Ellen Deutchman, 'Instituting Gender: State Legislators in Australia and the United States', *Women and Politics*, 16, 4, 1996, pp. 1-19.

12. Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn & Moris Fiorina, *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1987).

13. Norris, 'Women Politicians'.

14. John R. Hibbing & David Marsh, 'Accounting for the Voting Patterns of British MPs on Free Votes', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 12, 2, 1987, pp. 275-297.

15. Gerhard Loewenberg & Samuel C. Patterson, *Comparing Legislatures* (Lanham, NY and London, University Press of America, 1988), p. 261.

16. Swers, 'Are Women More Likely to Vote'.

17. Caroline J. Tolbert & Gertrude A. Steuernagel, 'Women Lawmakers, State Mandates, and Women's Health', *Women & Politics*, 22, 2, 2001, pp. 1-38.

18. Paul Allen Beck, *Party Politics in America*, 8-th ed. (New York, Longman, 1996), pp. 316-318.

19. Beth Reingold, 'Concepts of Representation Among Female and Male State Legislators', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 17, 4, 1992, pp. 509-537.

20. Mary Buckley (ed.), *Post-Soviet Women: From the Baltic to Central Asia* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997). For a comparative view see Carroll & Zerilli, 'Feminist Challenges to Political Science', p. 67.

21. A deep contradiction between the reflection about themselves, and the image of the ideal woman is very characteristic for both Russian female politicians and businesswomen. See Anna Temkina, *Russia in Transition: The Case of New Collective Actors and New Collective Actions* (Helsinki, Kikimora Publications, 1997), p. 168.

22. See the records for the Duma meeting of March 14, 1997. Data Source: <http://www.cir.ru/>.

23. Swers, 'Are Women More Likely to Vote'.
24. Beck, *Party Politics in America*, pp. 323-325.
25. Susan Welch & John Hibbing, 'Financial Conditions, Gender, and Voting in American Elections', *Journal of Politics*, 54, 1, 1992, pp. 197-213.
26. Samuel C. Patterson & Gregory A. Caldeira, 'Party Voting in the United States Congress', *British Journal of Political Science*, 18, 1988, pp. 111-131.
27. Beck, *Party Politics in America*, p. 339.
28. Matthew Soberg Shugart, 'The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government', *American Political Science Review*, 89, 2, 1995, pp. 327-343.
29. Vladimir Gel'man & Grigorii V. Golosov (eds.), *Elections in Russia, 1993-1996: Analyses, Documents, and Data* (Berlin, Edition Sigma, 1999).
30. Data for the beginning of the 1995 Duma's term. See *Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy 1995*, pp. 237-240.
31. In this study, both parliamentary factions and registered deputy groups are referred to as parliamentary parties. Deputy groups and factions have equal rights and privileges. The major difference between factions and deputy groups is that factions are being formed on the basis of electoral associations that cross the five percent barrier in the proportional section of elections, irrespective of the number of their representatives, while deputy groups may be formed by small parties' representatives, independents, and deputies 'delegated' to deputy groups by large factions.
32. Thomas F. Remington, 'Political Conflict and Institutional Design: Paths of Party Development in Russia', in John Löwenhardt (ed.), *Party Politics in Post-Communist Russia* (London and Portland, OR, Frank Cass, 1998), p. 214; I. M. Stepanov & T. Ia. Khabrieva, *Parlamentskoe pravo Rossii* (Moskva, Iurist, 1999), pp. 51-63.
33. Moshe Haspel, 'Should Party in Parliament be Weak or Strong? The Rules Debate in

the Russian State Duma', in John Löwenhardt (ed.), *Party Politics in Post-Communist Russia* (London and Portland, OR, Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 178-200; Joel M. Ostrow, *Comparing Post-Soviet Legislatures: A Theory of Institutional Design and Political Conflict* (Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 2000), pp. 93-117.

34. The President can dissolve the Duma if it rejects the President's nominee for the Prime Minister position thrice in a row. As the same time, the Constitution allows Duma to initiate a vote of non-confidence in the cabinet.

35. Another important factor pertains to the Supreme Soviet, the first post-authoritarian legislature and the Duma's predecessor. The Supreme Soviet's violent dissolution in 1993 sanctioned by Yeltsin, had been still remembered in Russia and abroad. The dissolution of the Duma would convincingly demonstrate the President's chronic inability to manage conflict with the legislative branch.

36. Iulia Shevchenko & Grigorii V. Golosov, 'Legislative Activism of Russian Duma Deputies, 1996-99', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53, 2, 2001, pp. 239-261.

37. Thomas F. Remington, Steven S. Smith & Moshe Haspel, 'Decrees, Laws, and Inter-Branch Relations in the Russian Federation', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 14, 4, 1998, pp. 287-322.

38. Joel M. Ostrow, 'Procedural Breakdown and Deadlock in the Russian State Duma: The Problems of an Unlinked Dual-Channel Institutional Design', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 50, 5, 1998, pp. 793-816; Stepanov and Khabrieva, *Parlamentskoe pravo Rossii*, pp. 59-62.

39. All the averages are calculated by the author. The data come from the official Web-site of the State Duma, <http://www.duma.gov.ru>.

40. Beck, *Party Politics in America*, pp. 319-323.

41. In the Duma elections of 1993, a gender-based organisation, Women of Russia, cleared the five percent barrier in the proportional section of the elections. On the floor, this organisation formed its own faction. In the 1995 Duma elections, the Women of Russia' list

gained 4.62 percent of the vote and thus failed to cross the threshold.

42. The Duma's Standing Order does not allow parties that did not clear the barrier to chair committees. Otherwise, the number of female committee chairs could be greater.

43. Although the FAR has eventually merged with Unity, it retains its own legislative faction.

44. Data for September 2000. Internet Source: <http://www.cityline.ru/politika/>

45. The same tendency may be observed in the U.S. Congress when it is dominated by the presidential party. See Beck, *Party Politics in America*, pp. 338-340.

46. John M. Carey, Frantisek Formanek & Ewa Karpowicz, 'Legislative Autonomy in New Regimes: The Czech and Polish Cases', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 24, 4, 1999, pp. 569-603.

47. See Beck, *Party Politics in America*, p. 318.

48. Sources: see note 39.

49. Data Source: <http://www.cityline.ru/politika/index.html>. The Standing Order of the Duma regulates the size of committees (12-35 members) but in practice, the sizes of committees can be both greater and smaller.

50. In this study, the term 'bill' includes not only federal laws but also legislative resolutions, which are an important component of the Duma's legislative activity.

51. Norris, 'Women Politicians'.

52. The reason for selection of the 18 and 16 welfare issue bills is purely methodological. To make comprehensive inferences regarding voting on welfare and women's issue bills, it is necessary to analyse comparable numbers of both types' floor votes. There were only few women's issue bills considered by both Dumas, and the majority of these bills are included in the study. Hence the limited but comparable numbers of welfare issue bills. At the same time, I believe that an analysis of a greater number of welfare issue bills may be redundant in the

sense that it would hardly add anything new to the argument that emphasises the dominant role of party ideology in determining legislative voting on this sort of issues.

53. Michele A. Barnello, 'Gender and Roll Call Voting in the New York State Assembly', *Women & Politics*, 20, 4, 1999, pp. 77-93; Thomas, 'The Impact of Women on State Legislative Policies', p. 960-961; Thomas, *How Women Legislate*.

54. See note 52.

55. Ronald J. Berger, Patricia Searles & Charles E. Cottle, *Feminism and Pornography* (New York, Praeger, 1991).

56. Rosalind Marsh, 'Women in Contemporary Russia and the Former Soviet Union', in Rick Wilford and Robert L. Miller (eds.), *Women, Ethnicity, and Nationalism. The Politics of Transition* (London and New York, Routledge, 1998), p. 105; Lynne Attwood, 'The Post-Soviet Women in the Move to the Market: A Return to Domesticity and Dependence?', in Rosalind Marsh (ed.), *Women in Russia and Ukraine* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 255-266.

57. The data come from a mass survey conducted by ROMIR, a public opinion research agency. Data Source: <http://www.romir.ru/>

58. Petra K. Kelly, 'Women and Power', *Earth Island Journal*, 9, 1, 1993/1994, pp. 38-40.

59. Reingold, 'Concepts of Representation', p. 521-522.

60. Thomas, *How Women Legislate*, p. 65.

61. Cain et al., *The Personal Vote*.

62. Sarah Binder, Forrest Maltzman, & Lee Sigelman, 'Senators' Home-State Reputations: Why Do Constituents Love a Bill Cohen So Much More Than an Al D'Almato?', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 23, 4, 1998, pp. 545-560.

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