Civil society and social capital in the post-socialist Russian north

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Abstract

Social capital is a concept that has become popular in describing and understanding the content of civil society networks and their relationship to democratic practice. Two theories of social capital are discussed with relation to two Canadian-sponsored democratization initiatives in the Russian north. The author concludes that while the concepts are useful in understanding the problems of democratic transition in Russia, their applicability as models for democratization projects remains limited unless they are incorporated within a robust theory and practice of democratic politics.

Introduction

As both researchers and democracy practitioners seek to isolate the ingredients of the genetic soup from which sustainable democratic institutions and practices can emerge, much attention has been placed on factors outside formal political structures and legal frameworks. The importance of delving beneath the superfice of democratic rhetoric is evident, for rare is the despotic state unarmed with a constitution guaranteeing rights protections comparable to the most ‘advanced’ Western democracy. The concepts of civil society and social capital have assumed a pre-eminent position in this endeavour to describe and define the non-formal and often intangible social structures and interconnections that may help institutionalize democratic practice.

Nowhere has the search for the building blocks of democracy appeared more urgent than in the countries of the former Soviet Union, where initially high hopes for the democratic transition have often been replaced by resignation to a lengthy period of aimless and often lawless authoritarianism. Outside the Baltic republics, none of the newly independent states could legitimately be described as fully democratic, while many if not most better deserve the epithet ‘fully undemocratic’. Although some aspects of the Russian Federation’s post-Soviet experience have been relatively positive in comparison with other former Union republics, the Russian north has witnessed a variety of disturbing developments, including the capture of state institutions by a kleptocratic oligarchy, poorly defined divisions of power between the Federation and its various subject government institutions, and the overwhelming predominance of industrial and resource
extraction interests in the decision-making process. Not unconnected to these developments, most northern people, and particularly indigenous people, have suffered a dramatic and continuing worsening of their conditions of life, to the extent that numerous communities have been abandoned.

The long period of Communist Party rule and state economic and political monopoly is often cited as a reason for the relative failure of democratization efforts in the Russian north and indeed Russia generally. Dictatorial rule restricted the development of the extensive networks of informal and formal civil society networks needed to assure broad access to decision-making. According to some accounts of Communist society, social capital, the intangible bloodstream of civil society networks, was almost absent. In other accounts, social capital was present, but highly concentrated in a narrow and closed set of largely vertical relationships.

While the nature and role of civil society and social capital in post-Socialism remains largely under-theorized, strategies to build civil society and thus create or redistribute social capital have assumed a dominant position in the democracy and governance strategies of Russia’s major development aid partners, particularly the United States, Canada, the countries of the European Union, and the international financial institutions. Substantial resources have been allocated to support civil society in Russia and the other former Union republics.

Research in the Russian north and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union appears to confirm that the population is much less active in civil society activities than in the west. Further, political power is exercised without the broad input and overt interest-balancing that has become the norm in North America and western Europe. It does not necessarily follow, however, that a more inclusive political system can be constructed through the confection of civil society through development aid. Rather, it may be that a broad civil society is an outcome of a redistribution of political power that can only come about through the overt articulation of different and conflicting interests. Civil society is largely absent because it has no place in a Russian political
system dominated by a small core of industrial interests. While Western support for consensual civil society activities may create the illusion of democratic discourse, participation is likely to be minimal and the projects unsustainable until they take place within a political system that includes, and tolerates, conflict. The basis for such an ‘agonistic’ democracy is present in much of the Russian north and elsewhere in the former Union, in that there is a substantial current of opinion favouring a return to some or all of the social protections of the Soviet era. These voices are, however, systematically marginalized by the Russian administration. Ironically, this marginalization occurs with the complicity of the Western democracy and governance community that views nostalgia for the Soviet system as anachronistic at best, and at worst a threat to the transition. While a return to the Soviet system is implausible, the idealization of the Soviet era reflects the rationally held view of many northern people that they possessed more economic, human, and social capital then, than they do now.

I begin by exploring the foundations of the concepts of civil society and social capital, then examine the use to which these concepts have been put in developing western democracy aid projects. I then discuss some of the objections that have been raised to various aspects of civil society and social capital theory, and reflect on two case studies of civil society development in the Russian north. Tying together the empirical and theoretical material, I conclude by proposing a model of civil society in the Russian north that places social capital within a context of unequal power relations that are not readily changed without developing practices and structures that permit the airing and resolution of fundamental conflicts over political and economic power.

The conceptual framework of civil society and social capital

The term civil society, albeit with widely differing meanings, has deep historical roots. Employed during the Renaissance by Machiavelli to denote the rights of a citizen, it acquired its more common modern meaning almost two centuries ago, when De Tocqueville noted the
positive relationship between an active citizenry and democracy. Visiting America, he was struck by the busy-ness of its citizens, who were, “forever forming associations. There are not only commercial and industrial associations in which all take part, but others of a thousand different types—religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, immensely large and very minute”. Activity in these associations led more or less naturally to participation in political life.

Harvard academic Robert Putnam is the most prominent current theorist of civil society and of its ‘product’, social capital. Putnam defines civil society simply as that social place located between the individual and the state. It comprises in its most elementary sense the family, but spreads out into an almost infinite number of more or less well organized associations. These associations range from the extremely informal, such as bowling leagues, to longstanding and deeply institutionalized bodies such as churches and trade unions. Putnam argues that, “quality of public life and the performance of social institutions (and not only in America) are indeed powerfully influenced by norms and networks of civic engagement”. Societies that have a high level of civic involvement, and particularly, a dense network of different civil society engagements, are more successful. They have “better schools, faster economic development, lower crime, and more effective government”.

The civil society development approach is based upon an assumption that democracy needs to be a broader concept than that encapsulated in so-called ‘economic’, ‘adversarial’ or ‘aggregative’ theories that have been popular in American political science circles since the 1950’s. According to these theories, political life is a market parallel to that existing in the economic sector. People act from self-interest, and the political system is nothing more than a method for the aggregation of these self-interests. Politicians offer a slate of promises to the electors, who act rationally in choosing the slate that most benefits them. Consensus is possible only on establishing rules for the procedures to determine how self-interests are to be calculated, and not on some notion of ‘common interest’ or ‘the public good’.
Proponents of civil society-based democracy argue that the adversarial model oversimplifies the actual operation of democracy. Democratic representation includes a number of different processes, including traditional direct ‘representation through promising’, but also representing the values to which the elector subscribes, by representing the group with whom the elector identifies, and by undertaking to act through dialogue with the elector.\(^6\) Democracy thus is not simply the act of selecting a representative, but rather a process of deliberation, conducted through the multiple networks of mutual association which exist in advanced human societies and which have come to be known as ‘civil society’.

While civil society is a relatively well-accepted concept, albeit subject to widely divergent interpretations, social capital is a more recent addition to sociological discourse, initially developed notably by the French radical theorist Pierre Bourdieu\(^7\) and the American sociologist James S. Coleman\(^8\).

Bourdieu proposed that there are three forms of capital, including economic capital as commonly understood, but also cultural capital, and social capital. Cultural capital encompasses both the physical manifestations of ‘culture’ such as art and theatre productions (‘objectified’), but also the personal accumulation of informal and formal education (embodied)\(^9\). Social capital is defined as, “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.”\(^10\) Bourdieu’s analysis is derived from Marxist and post-Marxist class theory, and the concept of power is inherent in his analysis. The various forms of capital, which are interconnected and in some cases partly derivative of each other, act together to provide individuals more or less power. Groups of individuals pool their different capitals to produce more or less stable power blocs and exercise control over more or less of the social and economic terrain. For Bourdieu, social capital is a constituent element of power.
Coleman also argued that social capital is the product of durable mutual relationships, although his perspective was not necessarily linked to a competition for power, a concept central to Bourdieu. For Coleman, social capital is instantiated in social relationships; located between individuals and groups. Social capital exists when norms and values facilitate actions by others. Coleman’s classic example is the trust existing between diamond dealers, who hand over to each other for private inspection diamonds worth hundreds of thousands of dollars without any form of security. However, social capital does not necessarily exist outside the specific relationship; the person who is prepared to undertake a specific transaction at work through handshake alone is unlikely to sell his house to a stranger on that same handshake. While Coleman emphasizes the similarities between social capital and other forms of capital, he is also careful to note that the analogy cannot be taken too far. For example, the notion of reciprocity that is critical to social capital has no parallel in the sphere of economic capital, and human capital can to a significant extent be transferred to different settings, which is not the case for social capital.

Robert Putnam builds upon Coleman’s model, while significantly broadening the definition and the applicability of the social capital concept:

“the collective value of all ‘social networks’ [who people know] and the inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each other [‘norms of reciprocity’].”

For Putnam, social capital is a critical element of any successful society. It inheres both in individuals and in societies – that is, it has both an individual and a collective face. It can be both a private and a public good, and can be either specific or generalized. In other words, people may do things for others either because of a specific sense of obligation, or more generally because they feel a sense of kinship with a particular group in society that will benefit (or even with society as a whole). Social capital is made up of three constituent elements. These are social networks, moral norms and obligations, and social values. Social networks include informal and
formal networks and associations, of which participatory voluntary associations are the most effective in creating “horizontal interaction and reciprocity” which are at the core of social capital. Moral norms and obligations underpin institutions of reciprocity. Social values, particularly trust, are built from the practice of social networking within a context of moral norms and obligations.

Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Putnam called for the West to provide aid to build social capital in addition to its support of strengthened financial and human capital:

“For example, current proposals for strengthening market economies and democratic institutions in the formerly Communist lands of Eurasia center almost exclusively on deficiencies in financial and human capital (thus calling for loans and technical assistance). However, the deficiencies in social capital in these countries are at least as alarming. Where are the efforts to encourage ‘social capital formation’? Exporting PTAs or Kiwanis clubs may seem a bit far-fetched, but how about patiently reconstructing those shards of indigenous civic associations that have survived decades of totalitarian rule.”

**Western aid and civil society in Russia**

The idea that the West could help build democracy in the former Soviet bloc through civil society development predated Putnam’s injunction, originating with strategies to support the democratic movement in Poland in the 1970’s and 1980’s. The Polish people chafed more regularly and more insistently than any other nation against the imposition of Communism and Russian domination. Nevertheless, peaceful system change was not possible given the Brezhnev doctrine justifying Soviet military intervention in the event that the Communist system should be threatened in the countries of central and eastern Europe. While western governments were well aware of the dissatisfaction of much of the Polish population with their government, they felt obliged to respect the terms of the Yalta agreement that placed Poland in the Soviet sphere, and were not willing to risk nuclear catastrophe in supporting a violent uprising. In this context, it was generally accepted that overt and intransigent opposition to the Polish Communist government would only lead to bloodshed and the further hardening of Soviet control in Poland and
elsewhere. However, support for civil society, particularly the church and later the independent trade union movement could encourage reform without posing a direct challenge to the system\textsuperscript{15}. The success of the Solidarity trade union movement in 1980 and 1981 posed a far more immediate and direct threat to the Polish Communist government than civil society advocates had proposed or anticipated\textsuperscript{16}.

While it is by no means clear that western support for civil society significantly impacted the denouement of events in Poland\textsuperscript{17}, when the Communist bloc collapsed at the end of the 1980’s, the Polish civil society experience inspired western policy makers to invest much of the aid budget for the democratization process in civil society strengthening projects. Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the incoming Clinton administration reorganized the federal government’s international development agency, USAID, establishing within the agency the new Centre for Democracy and Governance. The Centre continues to provide “technical and intellectual leadership to USAID’s decentralized mission-based structure”\textsuperscript{18}. Civil society is one of the four pillars USAID views as essential to democratic governance:

“The hallmark of a democratic society is the freedom of individuals to associate with like-minded individuals, express their views publicly, openly debate public policy, and petition their government. ‘Civil society’ is the term that best describes the nongovernmental, not-for-profit, independent nature of the organizations that allow for this type of broad citizen participation.”\textsuperscript{19}

Similarly, the Canadian government emphasizes the importance of civil society to its development programs – particularly those targeted towards Russia. The Canadian International Development Agency’s most recent discussion paper on its strategy for programming in Russia notes that:

The crux of genuine representative democracy is a vibrant civil society consisting of organizations and groups that are capable of contributing to society's welfare outside of state structures. These organizations can be both critical and supportive of government policy, and it is through their interaction with government that the interests of the citizens can be best served.\textsuperscript{20}
Canada has, of course, always taken a special interest in international northern affairs. The Arctic Council was formed in 1996 through Canadian initiative as a forum for circumpolar cooperation among the eight countries with Arctic territories. The next year, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade completed a comprehensive report on international northern development, *Promoting Democratic approaches to circumpolar sustainable development*\(^{21}\), emphasizing, as the title suggests, the contributions Canada can make in building democratic decision-making in Russia’s north. In May 2000, the government released a Northern foreign policy statement, *The Northern dimension of Canada’s foreign policy*\(^{22}\), which enshrined in government policy the goal “to promote the human security of northerners and the sustainable development of the Arctic.” A primary means to accomplish this will be through a “capacity-building focus”. While the problems of the indigenous people of the Russian north are singled out for particular attention, the paper argues that participation in the policy process provides a potential solution to at least some of the social and economic problems facing these communities:

> “With subsidy programs curtailed or ended, some settlements are returning to self-sufficient economies and struggling to revive their traditional culture. Living conditions remain harsh. Finances appear inadequate to support the re-emergence of sustainable Indigenous communities. At the same time, political reform has granted greater autonomy to Indigenous peoples, who are actively looking for ways to become involved in both the domestic and international northern policymaking processes.”\(^{23}\)

Given the expectation of producing demonstrable results in the short term, western government development agencies tend to emphasize the more directly political aspects of civil society development in Russia, typically supporting institutionalized non-governmental organizations that provide input to the political process. For example, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) identifies following goals of its civil society support activities:

> “The presence of a dynamic civil society helps to ensure that individuals are informed and able to influence issues which affect them. Support can be
provided for the development of the independent institutions of civil society, such as women's organizations, aboriginal organizations, the independent media, advocacy groups, unions, professional associations and autonomous community organizations in fields such as health, social services and environmental protection.  

**Promise and problematic of civil society and social capital theory**

The concept of social capital was developed separately by Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman. Subsequently, Robert Putnam popularized the term, leaning much more heavily on the work of Coleman than that of Bourdieu. I have already outlined some important differences between Bourdieu and Coleman’s analysis, and will now more closely examine these differences and the impact they have on an understanding of democratic transformation.

Coleman’s social capital theory was developed as a means to bridge economic and sociological explanations of the world. The weakness of the economic model was that it focused on the rational individual acting to maximize utility, to the exclusion of the social context. Conversely, the sociological model tended to emphasize the socialization of the individual into a system of “norms, rules, and obligations” that explain how actions are shaped by the social context. Social capital theory would employ the economic concept of rational action (utility maximization) in order to explain how an individual makes use of available social resources, defined as social capital. Coleman details several different forms of social capital, including that arising from mutual obligations and expectations within a trustworthy structure, the social capital that inheres in information channels, and the social capital that is created by norms of conduct and sanctions for deviance.

He then goes on to describe the types of social structure facilitating social capital. The critical feature is closure of social structure, in other words social systems where manageable and defined networks account for the majority of an individual’s interactions. For example, the diamond dealers’ network mentioned above is made up largely of people from one ethnic group,
whose lives are organized around the cultural, religious, and professional life of an identifiable and relatively homogeneous community. For someone to steal one of the diamonds would lead to exclusion from the trustworthy structure and make professional activity impossible, constituting an effective sanction.

Coleman’s analysis is primarily geared towards the individual, family, and local neighbourhood level, though he does imply that it has an additive quality that allows society as a whole to benefit from its existence. He acknowledges that in a market society, social capital tends to be underproduced by individuals acting in self-interest. When its benefits cannot be captured by individuals, voluntary social organization generates the freeloader problem familiar to aficionados of rational choice theory.

The primary practical problem underlying Coleman’s analysis lies in his failure to integrate it into a broader theory of development and power. While he does, in passing, acknowledge that social capital can lead to a negative closure of alternatives, his argument that social capital is most efficiently created by dense, closed social network relationships ignores the close positive correlation between social fluidity and development. If we translate Coleman’s analysis back into the economic sphere, we find that in general the rural, conservative communities and societies that feature dense, closed social networks also tend to be the economically poorer, less developed communities and societies. This presents a fatal blow to Coleman’s argument, given that he presents social capital as a factor that combines with economic and human capital in fostering economic activity and wealth. For economic historians, of course, it is commonplace that revolutionary advances in economic productivity are predicated upon the rupture and reformation of ossified social relationships.

In his early work on social capital, Putnam tended to share and even extend Coleman’s tendency to view social capital as simply a social good. In 1993, for example, he dismissed the argument that strong non-market actors have a tendency to distort and damage economic
development through state capture and consequent policy distortion: “Strong society, strong economy; strong economy, strong state”\textsuperscript{27}. By 2001, however, he had developed an important refinement to social capital theory that acknowledged the potentially damaging impact of certain types of social capital; a distinction between ‘bridging’ social capital and ‘bonding’ social capital. As examples of organizations which build bridging capital and foster inclusivity, Putnam lists, ‘the civil rights movement, many youth service groups, and ecumenical religious organizations’. Among organizations that tend to build exclusivity through bonding are, “ethnic fraternal organizations, church-based women's reading groups, and fashionable country clubs”. Although under some circumstance bonding social capital can be of overall social benefit, particularly in permitting members of disadvantaged groups to establish themselves, Putnam clearly privileges bridging social capital, comparing it to WD-40, while bonding social capital is more like Superglue\textsuperscript{28}. The most effective way to create bridging capital is through formal voluntary associations.\textsuperscript{29} Societies founded upon the decentralized, horizontally structured endeavours of voluntary associations, such as those he studied in northern Italy, have more social capital and are thus more successful than those based upon vertical, hierarchical structures that he found in southern Italy. This final hypothesis underpins the strategy adopted by western aid agencies aiming to strengthen civil society organizations and thus replace vertical social links with horizontal ones.

Putnam’s 1995 article \textit{Bowling Alone} struck a chord with American liberal opinion, which was then searching for alternatives to statist progressivism embodied in the Rooseveltian New Deal. The article is said to have inspired two of President Clinton’s State of the Union addresses\textsuperscript{30}, and was later transformed into a book and a comprehensive web site promoting civil society, social capital, and communitarianism in general.

Unusual amongst academics, Putnam has placed great emphasis on the practical implementation of his ideas in development projects. Despite his enthusiasm, he has also warned
that civil society development projects may not be successful everywhere. His 1993 comment that “Palermo may represent the future of Moscow” is an allusion to the hierarchical character of both southern Italian and post-Soviet societies, and he draws attention to the difficulty building civil society where none exists: “local organizations 'implanted' from the outside have a high failure rate. The most successful local organizations represent indigenous, participatory initiatives in relatively cohesive local communities.”

Francis Fukuyama, who has worked with the concept of social capital from a neoliberal rational choice framework, goes further, questioning the overall viability of civil society development projects: “Foundations and government aid agencies seeking to promote voluntary associations have often simply managed to create a stratum of local elites who become skilled at writing grant proposals; the organisations they found tend to have little durability once the outside source of funds dries up.”

As always, the fame achieved by Putnam’s article attracted critics, among them Alejandro Portes and Patricia Landolt. They argue that Putnam stretches Coleman’s original concept of social capital in several important and unhelpful ways. To begin with, he assumes that social capital accumulates in the community and nation as a whole, as well as the individual or the group, whereas for Portes and Landolt, “Collective social capital, however, cannot simply be the sum of individual social capital. If social capital is a resource available through social networks, the resources that some individuals claim come at the expense of others”. Secondly, they accuse Putnam of confusing the existence of social capital with the benefits that accrue from it. This can lead either to an undervaluing of networks among poor people – which do not generate the same demonstrable outcomes as networks among the more affluent, or alternatively to a circular argument in which it is claimed that those who are successful are successful because they have social capital, while it might as easily be claimed that they have social capital because they are successful.
Bob Edwards and Michael Foley, and separately Martti Siisiäinen, question two additional aspects of Putnam’s analysis. First, they argue that the definitions and constituent components of civil society and social capital are largely normative, and vary substantially according to the context and the mores of those using the terms. Second, they challenge Putnam’s emphasis on trust as a key aspect of social capital. For example, one of the measures Putnam uses to show the decline in social capital is decline in trust in government. However, Siisiäinen argues that the high level of social capital found in Nordic countries arose as a product of the agitation of militant social movements that criticize the entire political system. In general, Putnam does not address the inherently conflictual nature of society except as a dysfunctional and undesirable phenomenon.

Despite the validity of some of the criticisms of Putnam, it is important to acknowledge that his work popularized the concept of social capital, opening up an important field of debate on social dynamics beyond neoclassical rational choice theory and Marxist economic determinism. Putnam has also rescued Coleman’s social capital theory through the definition of two types of bonding and bridging social capital.

Although some of Bourdieu’s work is well-known, particularly that on the determinants of educational success, his ground-breaking work on social capital theory, predating both Coleman and Putnam, has attracted relatively little attention, even from the left. A laudatory obituary published in one of Britain’s leading leftist journals shortly after his death in 2002 failed even to mention social capital. One reason may be that, for Bourdieu, social capital theory was an alternative to both the main strands in current left thinking, semiologism and economism:

“The real logic of the functioning of capital, the conversions from one type to another, and the law of conservation which governs them cannot be understood unless two opposing but equally partial views are superseded: on the one hand, economism, which, on the grounds that every type of capital is reducible in the last analysis to economic capital, ignores what makes the specific efficacy of the other hand, and on the other hand, semiologism (nowadays represented by structuralism, symbolic interactionism, or ethnomethodology), which reduced social exchanges to
As the above quotation suggests, it is necessary to contextualize Bourdieu’s social capital theory in order to understand its significance. Bourdieu belonged to the generation of French intellectuals who lived through the period of disillusionment with the Communist project. While Communism was always a minority perspective within the English-speaking intellectual community, the opposite had been true in France, where the Communist Party was the leading political party after the end of World War Two. The predominant Stalinist social theory claimed that history had a predetermined outcome, based upon the development of economic forces, and that this outcome entailed the worldwide victory of Soviet-style Communism. The gradual realization beginning in the 1960’s that this outcome was neither likely nor desirable created widespread disillusion amongst French intellectuals, both in the possibility of understanding society through a metatheory, such as Marxism, and in the practical project of liberation. Many French intellectuals embraced postmodernist philosophy, adopting an agnostic or even conservative outlook towards politics. Bourdieu shared the rejection of Soviet Communism and of Marxist determinism, but sought to rebuild an explanatory theory of inequality that would include social as well as economic factors. His three-element description of capital – economic, cultural, and social – is central to this project.

Unlike Coleman and Putnam, Bourdieu views social capital as neither good nor bad, but rather an element in the process of social structuration. Society is divided into a plurality of fields, in each of which the different forms of capital are recombined in different proportions in order to exercise power within that field. These proportions are not predetermined and in fact within each field there is a continual struggle for pre-eminence between those holding different proportions of the forms of capital, leading to an ever-changing balance of power-sharing in each field.
Social capital is a resource based upon group membership and social networks. Voluntary associations represent a potentially potent producer of social capital because, if they are well-organized, they have the ability to concentrate the social capital of individual members, and create a multiplier effect that produces additional social capital that can be shared by the individual members. However, in order to be effective, social capital must be recognized by the wider membership of the field, and ultimately, society as a whole. Capital accepted by the relevant broader community is defined by Bourdieu as symbolic capital: “capital, in whatever form, … perceived by an agent endowed with categories of perception arising from the internalization (embodiment) of the structure of its distribution, i.e. when it is known and recognized as self-evident.”

In general, the exercise of power is predicated upon the ability of a dominant group not merely to enforce its domination, but to do so through symbolic power in such a way that its dominance is taken as self-evident.

Bourdieu’s model of social capital, incorporating an explanation of interest conflict, is more sophisticated than that of Coleman and Putnam, who ignore the possibility that social capitals can be in conflict with each other. The individuals in Coleman and Putnam’s models use their social capital to improve their circumstances, but except in isolated examples of deviant conduct, fail to acknowledge that social capital can be used to dominate and to limit the value of social and other capital held by others. Through an emphasis on the social value of trust, they perhaps inadvertently propose quietism in the face of injustice and inequality.

Bourdieu’s approach reaches its limits, however, in its applicability as a guide for action, and he has been described as a pessimist even by his followers. Putnam and Coleman’s model, though perhaps naïve, at least has the merit that it proposes something that the excluded might do in order to improve their circumstances. As a post-Marxist, Bourdieu’s abandonment of economic determinism leaves open the question the means for effecting change, though his assertion that the conversion of the various forms of capital into symbolic capital is marked by perpetual
contestation leaves space for the articulation of a theory of social change consistent with his model.

Example one - The Yakutsk Municipal Democratization Project

Canada has long enjoyed a special relationship with the Soviet and now the Russian north, based upon the common geographic, climatic, and demographic challenges facing both countries. Co-operation projects began many years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and expanded rapidly in the last years of the Union and the first years of democratization. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the primary vector for Canadian aid to the Russian north was the ministry of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND). For some time after the collapse aid projects for the former Soviet bloc in general were handled through the foreign affairs ministry, but in 1996 these responsibilities were merged with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the independent government department handling aid to developing countries. Foreign Affairs and CIDA sought to assert their role in the Russian north, the former because of the priority Canada places on the northern political dimension, the latter because of a desire to concentrate within its structures all development assistance.

The social planning council movement in Canada has a long history, dating back to social reformers in the early years of the 20th century, who sought to resolve the growing cities’ trenchant social problems through a concerted social planning approach. In the absence of strong municipal government leadership, between 1920 and 1950 the social reformers established non-governmental social planning organizations in most of the major Canadian cities, the majority of which remain active today. While the role of social planning councils has changed over the years and between geographic locations, the organizations have typically engaged in social needs identification, advocacy for social programs, and co-ordination and evaluation of nongovernmental organizations.
Though Canadian social planning councils have typically remained focused on domestic activities, they have from time to time participated in international development projects. In 1995, following discussions between the Canadian foreign affairs ministry and a team of social planners and interested academics, a project was launched to share Canadian expertise on urban social planning with a Russian city. The site selected was Yakutsk, the capital of the Sakha Republic.45

Despite its isolation six time zones away from Moscow and well north of the Arctic Circle, Yakutsk has a long history as a Russian garrison-town and place of exile. In the Soviet era, Russians and others from the southern USSR were encouraged to move north by subsidies, higher wages, and exhortation to build the Motherland, and the population of the city grew to around 200,000, more than ten times larger than any community in the Canadian north. A large diamond deposit was exploited in the southern part of the Sakha Republic, while sometimes farfetched agricultural and industrial schemes brought further resources into the region. The end of Communism, while not as devastating as in much of the Russian north, brought an end to high wages for state employees, as well as subsidies and other benefits, and strained the formal and informal social safety net.

The purpose of the project was to strengthen community based social service organizations in Yakutsk so that they would be better able to cope with increasing responsibilities during the period of democratization. The key modality for strengthening the sector was through encouraging the formation of links between the various non-governmental organizations, so that they could jointly identify social needs, share expertise and other resources, and act as a common front in lobbying the municipal and other levels of government in Yakutsk.46 In short, the project aimed to set up a prototype social planning council that could help to strengthen civil society in order both to assume some of the responsibilities that had previously been assumed by the Soviet state, and at the same time empower civil society organizations to strengthen local democracy through broadening input into municipal decision-making.
Although the project began more than three years after Communist rule had ended in Moscow, change came about slowly in the further flung parts of the empire. A towering statue of Lenin continued to look down upon the city’s citizens on the eponymous main street, and former or current communists remained in power in both the Sakha Republic and the Yakutsk city administration.

The media remained almost exclusively state-owned, although the differing political persuasions of the municipal and republican levels permitted the journalists working for media owned by one level of government to report truthfully about what was going on at the other level. Thus, by reading the media of both levels of government, it was possible to construct a more or less accurate picture of what was going on in Yakutsk. Perhaps because of this airing of different viewpoints, the Canadian team encountered journalists working for Republican-owned media who were quite open about the weaknesses of the Republic’s president: “The president is someone who has the old communist view of life and he takes it into the new Sakha Republic. He spends too much money on buildings like the new ice skating rink, but doesn’t take care of social problems.”

The city administration was headed by Spartak Borisov, a Russian and unabashed Communist who had defeated a reformist incumbent in 1995. The Sakha Republic government was headed by the Yakut Boris Nikolaev, the Communist-era head of the autonomous republic of Yakutia who had made the successful transition to democrat upon the collapse of the USSR. According to his opponents, Nikolaev had also managed to convert Communist-era control into privileged access to privatized assets.

As happened in many other places, the late Soviet period had been marked by significant independent political activity. On June 3rd 1988, a rally of 6,000 people in the main square had denounced environmental damage in Yakutia, and a democratic political party had been formed.
as early as 1988, winning a seat on the Yakutsk city council in 1990. However, by 1997, reformers had either been co-opted by the ‘party of power’ or marginalized as cranks.48

Uncertainty about the merits of change impacted the civil society strengthening project. After an initial series of seminars involving city administrators and agency directors, held in the summer of 1995, city officials wondered whether it was appropriate to encourage the independent development of civil society.49 The reluctant administrators were eventually persuaded that it was worth pursuing the project, though the city administration continued to closely monitor the Canadian ‘experts’. The administration’s external relations director, as host, insisted on responsibility for identifying contacts and setting up meetings. Although she did accept requests to arrange meetings with local experts nominated by the Canadian team, certain of those meetings, particularly those that might be of a controversial nature, were repeatedly postponed until the experts’ visits came to an end50.

Eventually, the Canadian team identified three non-governmental organizations that were interested in the project, had an existence at least partially independent from the local administration, were willing to work together, had a genuine constituency, some interest in affecting policy, and offered services to their members or client group. It was agreed that, together with representatives of the city administration and the Academy of Science, they would found a provisional Yakutsk social planning committee.

One of the organizations was the Women’s Housing Association. Originally an offshoot of the Communist Party, this group had been responsible since Soviet times for managing several apartment buildings geared to the needs of women, particularly single parents. The organization was headed by Lena Malinovskaya51, a woman in her mid-thirties of Ukrainian ethnicity. However, the Association’s board included several prominent Yakut women. There was a substantial overlap between this organization and the federal Russian party, ‘Women of Russia’, for whom one of its leading members was a candidate in the Sakha republic elections of 1997.
The group was quite ambitious and entrepreneurial, operating a number of small businesses, including a television company that filmed commercials and political events, and broadcast television shows in one area of Yakutsk. The financial structure of the revenue generating activities was unclear.

The second founding organization was geared to the needs of troubled teenagers. This group was headed by Yuri Negretov, the charismatic former leader of the local Komsomol, an ethnic Russian man in his late thirties, who also holds a senior position in the recreation department of the city administration. The organization was involved in a plethora of different activities. Among those that would be familiar to similar organizations in North America; youth camps, setting up ice hockey rinks, a job-finding club, and summer camps. Among the less familiar; the purchase and resale of sporting clothing imported from China, and the sale of bootlegged videotapes from kiosks around the city operated by the teenagers. Negretov commented, “I hate to say it, but we are videotape pirates, we have to be.” Like the other associations participating in the project, the Teenager’s Association was formally incorporated, with a seven-person board of directors and even plastic decals advertising the group’s charitable work. But the board met only twice a year, and while the Association had a full-time executive director, all hiring decisions were made by Yuri as the volunteer chairman of the board. In 1997, the local media broadcast allegations that Negretov was involved in the mafia, allegations he rejected as emanating from professional jealousy.

The third core organization was Rebirth, a self-help group for disabled people. This organization was headed by a Dmitry Razumov, 34 years old in 1995, a Buryat-Evenk métis who had grown up in the Ulan Ude region south of the Sakha Republic. He had become disabled in the early 1980’s as a result of an unsuccessful back operation, and perhaps this experience had led him to become deeply cynical towards power in general. “In the old days, the system was a dictatorship. Now it is run by democrats. A dictatorship of democrats.” During an early
encounter, he looked at his crutches, saying, “before I was on these, I had illusions. When you have to walk around on these, you get realistic.” His relationship with the various levels of the administration was rocky, although he was adept at exploiting political and personal divisions, as well as combining denunciations of his current foes with sycophantic praise for those who supported his requests. Like the other groups, Rebirth was involved in traditional charitable as well as apparently commercial activities, though its commercial activities, such as a radio repair shop, seemed somewhat ramshackle and of dubious viability. Rebirth incorporated in 1993, about eighteen months before the civil society project began. The association had a nine-person board of directors meeting every three months. However, Razumov was both the chairman of the board and the executive director, and at the association’s meetings that we attended, he dominated the discussion. His control of the group seemed to rest on the power of his personality. A fellow board member said, “Dmitry is a real fighter. He’s very persistent, very stubborn, but in a good way. The group’s offices were in a large hall, which doubled as a drop-in centre, although this only seemed to operate on special occasions.

In addition to the three representatives from the voluntary sector, and the city external affairs director, the city was represented by Larisa Talanova, a former elected councilor who was now part of the city administration staff with responsibility for the communications and public relations department. A Yakut woman in her fifties, she was linked with the reform faction on the city council, and introduced the Canadian group to several of the Sakha republic’s Soviet-era dissidents, who had by then been almost entirely marginalized from the Republic’s post-Soviet power structures.

Finally, the group included a senior staff person from the Social Research Institute, affiliated to the Siberian and Sakha Republic Academies of Science. Daria Shelepina, the Russian woman nominated by the Institute was the daughter of a leading Sakha Republic academic, with a number of academic publications in her own name. The Institute, which included in its mandate
the identification of social problems and the development of proposals to address these problems, was involved in the project both to provide a theoretical sounding-board and to encourage the Institute’s development as a consulting resource to civil society. In retrospect, this aspect of the project did not produce results. Although Shelepina participated assiduously in the project meetings and other activities, she perceived her role as producing academic research on the project, and there was no feedback loop into the project activities.

In the course of the two-year project, members of the Canadian team met with numerous other representatives of ‘civil society’ organizations, including environmental, neighbourhood, student, trade, and political and quasi-political associations. The structure and operation of these organizations tended to confirm the observations made of the co-ordinating group. Most of Yakutsk’s fledgling civil society groups appeared to have four predominant characteristics: charismatic and even domineering leadership, close relationships with the government power structure, a generally narrow circle of active members, and a blurring of the distinction between charitable and commercial activities.

In a joint planning seminar involving the Canadian and Russian project participants, it was decided the project would proceed with a visit to northwestern Canada to observe first-hand the operation of the Canadian voluntary sector. Following the visit, the Canadian side would make available a small pot of money that the Yakutsk committee could disburse to support collaborative social service projects involving civil society.

There was some disagreement on the Russian side about who should make the trip to Canada. Several of the Yakutsk group objected to Dmitry Razumov’s participation on various grounds, ranging from the difficulty he would have traveling due to his disability, to his inadequate professional status, the latter reason being apparently the decisive problem. The Canadian group insisted, however, that the six members of the co-ordinating committee travel as a team. They visited Canada in June 1996, participating in a study program in the cities of
Edmonton and Prince George$^{53}$. Their program included visits to a number of voluntary agencies operating innovative social programs in each of the team members’ areas of expertise, political representatives from the three levels of the Canadian government, representatives from a university Northern Studies program, and municipal program administrators.

The outcome of the visit was positive and the group returned to Russia extremely enthusiastic about implementing several of the initiatives they had observed. The only “dark spot”, to use the words of one of the group, was a couple of incidents involving Razumov. During a visit to a large shopping centre in Edmonton, Razumov revealed that he had several thousand dollars that he wished to use to purchase items to smuggle back into Russia and resell, upsetting several of his colleagues who were worried he would be caught and the whole group portrayed as abusing their opportunity to travel. Subsequently, shortly before the group’s departure from Canada, Razumov failed to appear at a rendezvous, instead sending the message that he planned to claim political asylum in Canada. After the intervention of the group’s Canadian-based translator, he agreed that life would probably be extraordinarily difficult for him in Canada, given his lack of knowledge of English, his limited formal education, and his inability to do physical work, and he rejoined the group in time to catch the flight. Several members of the group approached the Canadian organizers and advised them that they had predicted this ‘embarrassment’ that followed from the our failure to understand that it was unfair to expect someone who was not professional to profit from such an experience and to behave properly in such circumstances.

During follow-up visits to Yakutsk in 1996 and 1997, the Canadian team worked with the Russian group to implement the demonstration phase, in which seed funds of about $15,000 were to be provided to support collaborative projects. The process for determining the projects was much more difficult than anticipated. During the first meeting, vague ideas were floated around the table, but the Russian members seemed unwilling to commit themselves to projects.
Eventually, Yuri Negretov of the Teenagers’ Association challenged the Canadians, “why don’t you tell us what you want us to do instead of trying to make us guess what you want?” Only after lengthy discussions were the Canadians able to persuade the Russian group that the promised sum would be disbursed to the Yakutsk co-ordinating committee no matter which projects were selected, as long as they met the simple criteria that had been established some months before. At the next meeting, each of the groups produced separate proposals, none of which involved working together, and each one of which exceeded by several hundred percent the total funds available. Finally, after a third iteration of the ‘rules of the game’, two projects were developed and funded, one involving collaboration between the Teenagers’ Association and the city administration on youth employment, and the other for providing homecare for disabled people in a collaboration between the Rebirth group and the Women’s Housing Association.

Larisa Talanova, and Olga Nezhina, the two city administrators on the co-ordinating committee, had been inspired by the operation of the Edmonton Food Bank during their Canadian visit. When the Canadians returned in 1997 for an evaluatory mission, an emergency food program had been successfully established by the city administration, completely independently of the civil society organizations, and without any external support.

The Yakutsk project highlighted many of the issues raised by theorists of civil society development. In general, it confirmed Putnam and Fukuyama’s concerns about the potentially barren environment for civil society in the post-Soviet Union. Considering the size of the city, there was a dearth of civil society organizations. Even the existing organizations tended to be small. The hierarchical nature of post-Socialist society in Yakutsk was evident not merely in relations between civil society organizations and the state, but also manifested itself within civil society organizations, which were typically centred around the activities of one individual, operating through charismatic rather than participatory leadership. In addition, there was a dislocation between the ‘intellectual’ labour of the academy and the ‘practical’ labour of service.
delivery. Throughout, there was a tendency towards hierarchical, vertical relationships rather than the horizontal links championed by Putnam.

In several organizations, there was an overlap between benevolent and directly political activities, and in most, the line between service and commercial activities was vague, suggesting that the process of role definition and differentiation essential to a modern, open, and liberal society is only in its infancy.

The more successful civil society organizations were closely linked to the state, and were frequently an offshoot of government administration, or a reformulation of a former component of the Communist Party. Civil society organizations were not noticeably more innovative, and sometimes less innovative, than elements of the state structure staffed by employees associated with reform perspectives. However, the presence of competition and of differing perspectives in the political system, even though that competition was most evident between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ parties of power, provided opportunities for dialogue and debate, and permitted canny citizens like Dmitry Razumov to play off competing elements against each other in order to achieve their objectives. This feature of Yakutsk society is not well predicted by the Coleman-Putnam approach, where civil society is viewed essentially in isolation from state structures. The Yakutsk experience suggests that, while support to fledgling civil society in post-Socialism can help contribute to a broadening of the power structure, such an outcome is enabled only where space exists within the state political and administrative structures. It can therefore be concluded that, while support to civil society organizations is a potentially worthwhile endeavour, it should not be pursued as a ‘soft’ alternative to helping post-Socialist society tackle the fundamental question of political reform; the legitimacy and even necessity of dissent. Within an uncompetitive political system, civil society strengthening projects will too often simply assist the entrenchment of existing dominant interests.
If we examine the Yakutsk experience through a Bourdieuan lens, it seems that Yakutsk society in the mid-1990’s still lacked clear distinctions between economic and social capital. The entrenched social capital embodied in the Communist Party and nomenklatura remained dominant, even though the ‘party of power’ had undergone a schism.\textsuperscript{58} However, there was a general perception that the elite organized around the new party of power was employing its social capital in order to create economic capital. Embodied cultural capital was valuable during the Soviet era, particularly that associated with formal educational qualification, and this remained an important source of distinction between citizens. It is notable that class prejudice towards Dmitry Razumov was expressed primarily through reference to his lack of education. Similarly, Daria Shelepina’s role in the project as representative of the Social Research Institute was taken for granted, and although she did not contribute directly to the practical tasks, she was treated with deference during the meetings, with frequent reference to not only her cultural capital, but also that of her father, reflecting the historical prestige of the academic field. In the absence of the developed category of economic capital during the Soviet era, the cultural and social capital present in the academy weighed heavily in terms of symbolic capital, but this is rapidly eroding in the new conditions, though many academics have moved quickly to convert their Soviet era symbolic capital into economic capital.

\textbf{Example Two: The Siberian Federal District Project}

Between March 2001 and March 2002 the Circumpolar Liaison Directorate of the Canadian Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development organized several Canadian missions to Russia in order to examine ways in which Canada could work collaboratively within the Siberian Federal District\textsuperscript{59} in order to promote economic growth, democratic development, and circumpolar collaboration.
After initial meetings in Moscow and Novosibirsk, the Canadians decided to focus its efforts on Evenkiya, and in March 2002 a small group of experts visited Krasnoyarsk, Tura, and Nidym focusing primarily on governance and civil society issues in Evenkiya\textsuperscript{60}.

Although the Evenk Autonomous Okrug is geographically located immediately to the west of the Sakha Republic, with a similar climate, flora, and fauna, its social and economic circumstances are dramatically different. Even in Soviet times, Yakutia enjoyed the status of autonomous republic of the Russian Soviet Republic, while Evenkiya had to content itself with a much more limited local autonomy. This was partly understandable given the much smaller population of Evenkiya, at 21,000 in 1995 little more than one-fiftieth of that of the Sakha Republic. Despite the meager population, indigenous people make up fewer than one quarter of the total, with the titular nation making up fewer than one-seventh.\textsuperscript{61} Evenkiya’s status and boundaries have been altered on a number of occasions in the Soviet and post-Soviet era. Many of Evenkiya’s affairs are administered from Krasnoyarsk, and its future as a separate entity remains in question.

Substantial oil and natural gas reserves have been identified in southern Evenkiya, and in a context of rising oil prices in the 1990’s, the okrug attracted the attention of large Russian and international oil companies. Yukos, the largest Russian oil company, purchased a smaller company to secure control of the bulk of the fields, and drew up comprehensive plans for the exploitation of the resource. However, the Communist-backed Evenkiya governor, Aleksandr Bokovikov, had a reputation for being “unruly” and difficult to control\textsuperscript{62}. For the 2001 elections, Bokovikov was ‘persuaded’ not to run for re-election.\textsuperscript{63} Krasnoyarsk krai governor Aleksandr Lebed and Yukos chief Mikhail Khodorkovsky promoted their own candidates for the position in the 2001 election. Boris Zolotarev, a senior official in Khodorkovsky’s failed Menatep Bank and board member of Yukos, was elected by a narrow margin\textsuperscript{64}, after Khodorkovsky visited the okrug on the eve of election promising that Yukos would provide $5 to $7 million in food and fuel
annually, and a Yukos spokesman underlined that this would happen, “only when the region is headed by someone the company trusts.” Zolotarev, who continues to reside in Moscow, immediately set about fulfilling Khodorkovsky’s fuel commitment, as well as removing Yukos opponents from the Evenkiya administration.

The mission to Evenkiya began with a visit to the only formal civil society organization apparently active in Tura; Arun, the local Evenk branch of RAIPON. About thirty leaders and elders welcomed the Canadian guests in their large wooden office building and drop-in centre. While a spread of traditional foods was served, the leaders took turns giving speeches on the living circumstances of indigenous peoples in Evenkiya. The speeches were generally repetitive and didactic, but the message was clear. The association’s former president, a middle-aged woman currently writing her doctorate on Evenki culture, summed up the concerns:

“In the time of the Soviet Union, many good things were done for us, but today in the market economy it is not the same. We arrived at the socialist system of development by avoiding the difficult capitalist stage of development but now we are back at the capitalist stage, that should not be possible, but it is. In capitalism, aboriginal people don’t have a niche. We are appealing to the international community to protect us from the market. We are failing to protect our children from the ravages of the market. The government is experimenting with this market, but maybe it would be better if we had not had this experiment.”

Arun regarded the arrival of Yukos with caution:

“Yukos came here and said that they want to work here with us, but under these circumstances we have to be very careful and well-prepared. It is nice that they gave the community gas but we need to come up with a plan to share the natural resources.”

The Canadian team visited the mixed Evenki-Russian community of Naidym, a few kilometres from Tura on an ice road. As part of the visit, the village manager, Maria Zhivkants, organized a meeting at the small village office, which quickly became crowded with Evenki elders and other interested inhabitants. Ms. Zhivkants, of Latvian and Evenki ethnicity, administers her community from beneath a large, if yellowed picture of Vladimir Lenin, perhaps appropriate given the repeatedly negative accounting she gives of post-Soviet Union
developments, accompanied by murmurs of agreement and corroborating evidence from the onlookers. The message is more specific and less laden with ideological rhetoric than at Arun, but the conclusion is the same.

Although the village is one of the least isolated of the communities in the okrug, the population has declined from 360 to 296 in the past ten years. The aboriginal population is just over one-half the total, with Evenk making up just under one-half.

Like many Russian communities, even small villages such as Naidym, the community had a central heating system, involving about two kilometres of heating pipes. Due to the deterioration of the system, one quarter of the houses can no longer be connected, and approximately six weeks prior to the mission’s visit, during the coldest period of the year with temperatures below minus 40°, the combined electricity generator and heating plant ceased to function altogether. Eighty percent of the housing stock is in a critical state but no resources exist to repair it. Seven apartments are completely uninhabitable and some of the families living in them had to double up with relatives, while others simply left.

During the Soviet period the community had three reindeer herds with approximately 5,000 reindeer; after the privatization of the herds some of the animals were eaten by wolves, others ran away, and the rest were eaten by the population. Now there are none. There was also a chicken farm with 25,000 chickens but that also closed down after the Soviet collapse, along with a fur farm. Ms. Zhivkants laughs: “They were restructured”.

The only significant economic activity remaining is a collective farm, still owned by the okrug, that has eighty animals including pigs and milk cows. The farm also has an electricity plant, however the village cannot afford to pay for its electricity and has run up a deficit of 400,000 roubles, so its power has been cut off. The village has about two hectares of potatoes that are farmed collectively and lots of families have their own plots, which is how most people survive.
Ninety percent of the population does not have enough to eat. Food is provided to children through the Russian Red Cross, and the school has received some help through an American aid project. Alcoholism is rampant, but people cannot afford proper alcohol, so they drink mineral spirits that makes them sick.

Local government in Evenkiya had recently been restructured, resulting in the elimination of the three raions in the okrug, something that the people of Nadym opposed but their views were ignored. The raion used to pay for the community’s fuel. Although the okrug talks about local self-government, the kindergarten, school, and hospital have been removed from the village’s responsibility and now have their own separate budgets.

There is an annual meeting in the village, which approves the budget, and elections every two years for the village administration. But since there is not enough money to pay for even the most basic services, it doesn’t really make much difference who is elected. The budget needs are about two million seven hundred thousand roubles, but they receive only two million from the okrug. A good chunk of the budget goes on the bread subsidy; it costs twenty roubles to bake bread but the population pays only six roubles twenty kopecks.

The local population’s concerns appeared shared at least in part by the deputy governor, Elena Kuisheva, an Evenki woman who seemed to play a mediating role between Governor Zolotarev and the indigenous population, “It is true, the market has been a problem. But we do have to admit, 98% of the funds are state-donated.”

In common with other Russian jurisdictions, Evenkiya has an elected Assembly that passes legislation and monitors government activities, but is generally subordinate in powers to the chief executive official. The Canadian mission met with Anatoly Amosov, twice-elected Chairman of the Evenk Autonomous Okrug Assembly, as well as a number of the Assembly’s deputies.
Amosov, an economist and long-time Soviet-era Komsomol and CPSU activist, was much more positive about the situation than Arun or the residents of Naidym. Although the funds allocated are inadequate, it is a good thing that 3.4 million roubles (US$110,000) is to be invested in helping to regenerate the reindeer herds, and there are extensive plans to revitalize the Evenk culture and language as well as to improve recreational facilities.

In terms of longer-term political developments, he is less sanguine. “Unfortunately the State Committee for the North has been abolished so we have lost a link with central government. Perestroika led to the people of the north being forgotten. The only nation people talk about these days are the Chechens, but we are dying out without the need for guns.” As far as Yukos is concerned, his response appears contradictory,

“Of all the eighty-nine regions of Russia we are in the worst situation. Oligarchs are being given a free hand to run the regions, including here. We elected someone who is with Yukos. He is a nice guy but we can’t rely on the government. It is Yukos that is paying for things, this seems to be the only way to achieve self-government.”

The mission also arranged meetings with the senior officials of most of the key government and quasi-governmental institutions in Tura, including the Evenkiya region federal departments of social development, education, economic development, and natural resources as well as the Mayor of Tura, the okrug administration lawyer, and the director of the Agricultural Institute, the only post-secondary institution headquartered in the okrug. In Krasnoyarsk, the group met with the Russian federation oil and gas committee for Evenkiya. Finally, the group met with Governor Zolotarev.

All the senior officials, most of whom are Russians, acknowledged the difficult social and economic circumstances in the okrug and particularly of the indigenous peoples, but opinion diverged on what to do about the situation. The ‘reformers’ felt that indigenous people had been coddled during the Soviet era, and needed to become more productive and independent:
“Unfortunately during the Soviet power, they took so much care of the indigenous people that the kids were taken straight from the maternity home to the boarding schools until they were twenty years old.”

“We don’t want to provide people with a fish, but rather a fishing rod.”

“There are communities here in Evenkiya of Old Believers that are self-supporting. That is the difference between the Russian and the indigenous people.”

“Economically it is very unprofitable to operate the Native villages. The people of Naginsk have agreed to move. We will ask people elsewhere if they are prepared to move.”

On the other hand, several administrators who are also long-term residents of the North empathized with the plight of the indigenous population:

“It is good to exploit the subsoil resources but we need to make sure that the Native people benefit from this development”

“One problem is that the Russian Federation is going to take 74% of the resource revenues. In my opinion when money goes into general revenues like that it is lost to the local region.”

“We want to make sure that Evenkiya doesn’t turn into the next Tyumen, all the negative effects on the local population.”

“We are prepared to stand up to Gazprom and Yukos. They will have to pay for every hectare of land they use, and they will have to take notice of the opinions of the local land users.”

Governor Zolotarev presented as an organized, busy man. In contrast to the somewhat gloomy, dilapidated character of much of the administration building, his office is large, brightly lit, and well-equipped. As the Canadian team presented its findings, Zolotarev jotted down the salient points on a computer flip-chart. One of the team’s key recommendations was that Canada has expertise to share in working with indigenous peoples to help prepare them for oil and gas development. Zolotarev rejected this idea out of hand:

“it is too early. We have no concerns in this area. To be able to exploit the resources you need an effective transportation system. That involves building a pipeline. The level of confirmed reserves is insufficient for the construction of a pipeline. If a decision is eventually made on exploitation, then the okrug’s development will be based on the extent of that industrial activity.”

“The problem in Evenkiya”, he continued, “is that the people do not want to work. The Soviet power encouraged them to do nothing. We have to break them of that habit.” The first
thing to be addressed with the project, therefore, is employment, finding a way for the people to sustain themselves for the next five years. “The people must learn how to support themselves”.

Reviewing the current social situation in Evenkiya, it is evident that the very small population necessarily hampers the development of Putnamian civil society. Only one formal civil society organization was active, although this group was an important and long-standing one, with the capacity to speak out, if not necessarily to significantly impact decision-making. In a region so dependent upon external financial resources, horizontal social capital is of marginal value, except insofar as it links with vertical power networks. Thus, Vladimir Drevyansky, director of the Tura Agricultural college and the “authorized representative” of Zolotarev during the 2001 election and Vladimir Putin during the Russian presidential election, might be said to possess valuable social capital, but this type of capital lacks the durability and community-strengthening features that Putnam and Coleman emphasize. The residents of Naidym and the activists of Arun certainly possess social capital in terms of their ability to mobilize horizontal networks, but unfortunately those networks are ‘bonding’ rather than ‘bridging’ in Putnam’s terms. However, the people of Naidym, and doubtless the other communities of Evenkiya, lack the economic and human capital necessary to build bridging networks. To echo the criticism of Portes and Landolt, if we restrict ourselves to Putnam’s categories, the residents are caught in a vicious circle where their social capital is inadequate because they are unsuccessful, and they are unsuccessful because they lack social capital. Although a civil society strengthening project could be envisaged that would assist these communities, it would need to build the capacity to forge networks of resistance rather than (in the first instance) inclusion, because inclusion in the current relation of powers could only be into a kind of pacific subordination to the interests of Yukos.

The stark power imbalance evident in Evenkiya today can be fit within the Bourdieuan social capital model. For Bourdieu, social capital can be converted into symbolic capital only in combination with cultural and economic capital, and it is evident that in Evenkiya, the absence of
economic capital is decisive in restricting the convertibility of the indigenous peoples’ social capital. However, even Bourdieu’s model, designed to apply to modern society, needs to be stretched to apply in a situation of neo-feudal domination.

The former governor, Bokovikov, a native of Evenkiya who was elected in 1997 on a platform of resistance to the large oil companies, quickly found out that, “The property of the okrug is not much, beside the brick, four-floor administration building. There is not much else. The oil products belong to Krasnoyarsk. The airplanes to Moscow. What’s in the earth is Russian federation property.” A few months later he decided not run again. Even if the suggestion he was intimidated into this decision is discounted, his declared reasons for retiring demonstrate that the power elite in Russia does not need to mask its dominance through the conversion of its economic capital into symbolic capital: “I cannot guarantee the provision of winter supplies to the region, while Zolotarev can.”

In Evenkiya, neither Putnam nor Bourdieu’s model is entirely satisfactory. As a model for action, a role to which it aspires, Putnam’s approach pays insufficient attention to the context of power relations within which civil society development occurs. Integrative approaches may not be appropriate to circumstances of gross power imbalance, where they can institutionalize domination rather than foster heterogeneity. Indeed, despite Yukos’ comportment in the 2001 Evenkiya elections, in which the company essentially purchased control of the okrug, Mikhail Khodorkovsky has been feted in the West for his “visionary” financial contributions to civil society development in Russia. Khodorkovsky’s comments during a celebration in his honour at the Library of Congress do not attempt to hide his motivation, “We want to see a healthy civil society develop in Russia, and not just in abstract terms. We fully realize that life is easier if such a thing exists. . . . For us this is a sober business decision.”

While Bourdieu, in contrast with Putnam, leaves us under no illusion as to the relationship between social capital and power, the people of Naidym probably don’t find that
much consolation for their lack of food and fuel. As noted earlier, Bourdieu’s model lacks a change mechanism.

**Conclusion**

The process of democratization in Russia has been more complex and much slower than many analysts would have predicted, and no more so than in the country’s vast north. Civil society theorists provide a plausible explanation, and the two case studies in Yakutsk and Evenkiya appear to bear out their perspectives. Democracy builds upon the free expression of diverse perspectives and interests, and in the Russian north there is an underdeveloped framework of independent, horizontally as well as vertically integrated organizations that foster such free expression. Putnam’s approach of helping to build democracy through encouraging the development of these networks – in which social capital is embodied – has promise, but his disregard for the problems of broader political culture restricts the value of his methodology in a society such as Russia where authoritarianism is deeply embedded in social practice.

In contrast, Bourdieu situates his theory of social capital within a wider context of power relations, and thus accommodates more readily problems of power imbalance. His framework for the exercise of power through the interplay of the different forms of capital and their realization through symbolic capital provides an interesting perspective from which to observe social dynamics in the Russian north, although more so in Yakutsk than in Evenkiya, where the desperate circumstances of the local population permits oil barons to dominate overtly with cash rather than through legitimized symbolic capital.

For democracy to flourish in the Russian north, a simple civil society strengthening process needs to be augmented with changes to political culture that legitimize dissent and assure the representation of conflicting interests. Perhaps ironically, in both Yakutsk and Evenkiya, the only broader political manifestation of democratic conflict is assured by adherence to ‘Soviet
values’ and even the reconstituted Communist Party, a phenomenon that has been noted elsewhere\textsuperscript{74}. It is important that this perspective be acknowledged as part of legitimate democratic debate.\textsuperscript{75}

Although there are numerous models of democratic political practice, the concept of agonistic pluralism is an interesting recent development that attempts to steer a course between an excessively optimistic functionalism and a rigid model of class combat.

Chantal Mouffe, the originator of the theory of agonistic pluralism,\textsuperscript{76} begins with the perspective that conflict is an inherent and essential part of democracy. She builds upon the Althusserian concept of overdetermination of social identities\textsuperscript{77}, which argues that the plethora of different subject positions (individual and group identities) in modern society discounts the possibility of achieving some form of rational consensus:

“the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all on matters of common concern is a conceptual impossibility since the particular forms of life, which are presented as its ‘impediments’ are its very condition of possibility. Without them no communication, no deliberation would ever take place. There is absolutely no justification for attributing a special privilege to a so-called ‘moral point of view’ governed by rationality and impartiality and where a rational universal consensus could be reached.” [13]

For Mouffe, like Bourdieu, politics is about power. What purports to be ‘consensus’, even in the most elaborate of deliberative models, is the successful articulation of hegemony by an alliance of interests (in Bourdieu, the realization of symbolic capital), and the equally inevitable exclusion of other alternative articulations: “social objectivity is constituted through acts of power”.

As an alternative to the deliberative model upon which Putnam’s theory of social capital is constructed, Mouffe proposes agonistic pluralism. Agonistic pluralism acknowledges that there are mutually irreconcilable perspectives in human society, because our social identities and interests overlap with each other. The identities that predominate, do so because the purveyors of that discourse have hegemonized the debate. Instead of trying to create a mythical state of
power-free discourse, in which everyone is perceived as having had the right to speak and therefore is bound by the decision, Mouffe proposes that we acknowledge the legitimacy of conflict:

“An adversary is an enemy, but a legitimate enemy, one with whom we have some common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality. But we disagree on the meaning and implementation of those principles and such a disagreement is not one that could be resolved through deliberation and rational discussion. Indeed, given the ineradicable pluralism of value, there is not rational resolution of the conflict, hence its antagonistic dimension.”

If we adopt Mouffe’s approach, the critical feature in democracy is not some aggregate stock of social capital, but rather the provision and utilization of space for disagreement, “the terrain in which passions can be mobilized around democratic objectives and antagonism transformed into agonism”. Within such a framework, civil society organizations play a vital role, for they help to articulate broad perspectives and interests, channel passions, and feed into the democratic decision-making process.
Notes

1 This appears to be true for participation in formal organizations. It is more difficult to make such a
categorical assertion about informal networks, as they are difficult to measure.


1995, 65-78.

4 Putnam’s inclusion of the family in his implied definition of civil society (see “Bowling Alone” ibid, 74)
is not shared by most civil society researchers. The following definition excludes the family but includes
the other components in Putnam’s model: “An intermediate realm situated between state and household,
populated by organized groups or associations which are separate from the state, enjoy some autonomy in
relations with the state, and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their
interests, values or identities.” James Manor, “Civil Society and governance: a concept paper”. Institute of


7 Pierre Bourdieu, “The forms of capital”. John G. Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory and Research

Special issue supplement, S95 – S120.

9 This latter component of Bourdieu’s definition of cultural capital is similar to the more widely known
concept of ‘human capital’.

10 Bourdieu, ibid., 248.


Fourth International Conference "The Third Sector: For What and for Whom?" Trinity College, Dublin,
Ireland July 5-8, 2000. 6.


15 Bob Edwards and Michael Foley. "Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and Social Capital in Comparative

16 Z. A. Pelczynski. “Solidarity and 'the rebirth of civil society". In J. Keane (Ed.), Civil society and the

17 Ex post facto analysis demonstrates that the Soviet political system was already much more enfeebled
under Brezhnev than the West realised. In the face of a newly aggressive attitude on the part of the United
States under President Reagan, the new Gorbachev administration lacked the confidence in the Soviet
system necessary to force the Polish government to decisively repress Solidarity, as well as to intervene
militarily if the Polish government was incapable or unwilling to pursue such a strategy. While the
opposition was doubtless emboldened by covert and overt western support, the fate of the Hungarian
Revolution of 1956 and of the Tiananmen Square uprising of 1990 shows that decisive physical force can
trump even a mass uprising.


19 Ibid., 15.

20 Canadian International Development Agency. “Draft Russia Programming Strategy”. Hull, Quebec,
Government of Canada, 2000. 34.
22 http://www.dev.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arctic/NDCFP-e.pdf
23 Ibid., 15.
25 In fact, the concept of social capital predates both Bourdieu and Coleman. For example, it was used as early as 1961 by the urban theorist Jane Jacobs in her groundbreaking analysis of the factors behind urban decay and renewal. Jane Jacobs, Death and life of great American cities. New York: Random House, 1961. 138.
26 Coleman, ibid., S116-S118.
31 Putnam, 1993 ibid., 91.
34 Edwards and Foley ibid.
37 Bourdieu (1986), ibid., 254.
38 A ‘field’ encompassing, for example, the civil service, the university sector, or industry.
40 Indeed, in Putnam, there is a suggestion that ‘organizing to oppose’ is inherently dysfunctional. Siisiäinen, ibid., 8.
41 Wolfreys, ibid., 99. Bourdieu was deeply involved in the French progressive movement and thus this criticism is of his theory rather than his personal practice.
42 From 1995 to 1997 the author was responsible for this project on behalf of the Canadian executing agency, the Edmonton Social Planning Council. Except where cited otherwise, the material from this section is derived from the author’s field notes, primarily collected in December 1995 and January 1996, July 1996, and June and July 1997.
43 There is a continuing tense relationship between the Canadian International Development Agency and the Circumpolar Directorate within the northern development section of DIAND. CIDA appears to resent the existence of the Circumpolar Directorate, while the Directorate believes that its relationship with the Russian North, that long predates CIDA activities in Russia, warrants its continuing involvement and indeed the transfer of resources from CIDA to help pay for some of its activities.
Yakutsk was chosen largely because of the close working relationship that already existed between Yakutsk State University and the University of Northern British Columbia in Canada, from which one of the Canadian experts on the project had been recruited.


Interview with a journalist from the Sakha Republican newspaper, July 27 1996.


Author’s interview with Olga Nezhina, director of the City of Yakutsk department of external affairs, December 13 1995.

For example, one of the experts was particularly interested in establishing contact with and visiting a juvenile corrections facility with a view to exploring the reintegration programs in place; the Canadians were told repeatedly that this meeting was to take place ‘tomorrow’. Tomorrow never came.

I have changed the names of individuals and associations in this section.

Communist Party youth league.


A service offering free food hampers to families in crisis.

As a Canadian government-funded organization, the project did not engage with religious organizations except insofar as they were involved in human service delivery projects. Although the project team did hear of a few examples of church-based service activities, these appeared to be on a small scale only.

This discussion is not intended to be evaluative of the merits of the project.

A similar argument can be found in Ivan Doherty, “Democracy out of balance: civil society can’t replace political parties.” Policy Review 106 (April-May 2001), 25-35. A disappointing feature of Canadian assistance programs in Russia is that, apparently, a decision has been made not to support political party development, in contrast with both the United States and Germany, which fund large political party development programs. Interview with Leanne McKechnie, political officer, Canadian embassy in Moscow, June 27 1997.

To some extent, the schism between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ parties of power was ethnic. Many Russian and other Slavic residents were nostalgic for the old order, not necessarily because they like the Communist system, but because they felt discriminated against in the new order. Conversely, Yakuts were proud that they were now more or less in control of their own destiny, without the ubiquitous Russian apparatchik shadowing their every move. While this new-found freedom was attached to the ‘democratic’ label, the appellation is largely tangential.

In March 2000, President Putin established seven Russian regions in order to streamline federal government administration. The regions are administrative in nature and do not have constitutional status, and coexist with the 89 existing and sometimes overlapping federal jurisdictions, of which the Evenkiya Autonomous Okrug is one.

The Canadian team proposed a variety of potential programs to address the identified issues, which to date have not received funding approval.


Arun is the Evenk for ‘Rebirth’.

Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North.
Arun past president M.D. Smirnova, Canadian delegation’s meeting with Arun, Tura, Evenkiya, March 4 2002, author’s meeting notes.

Arun president Yevgenia Alekseyeva, Canadian delegation’s meeting with Arun, Tura, Evenkiya, March 4 2002, author’s meeting notes.


Interview with Aleksandr Bokovikov, Novaya gazeta. 28 December 2000.

Ekspert. 16 April 2001. While these comments are only attributed to Bokovikov by one of his aides, he is directly quoted making less pithy but substantially identical comments in Nezavisimaya gazeta-regiony, March 13 2001.


Doherty, ibid., excludes the Communist Party of the Russian Federation from the category of ‘democratic political parties’, and his democracy-building organization, the Washington-based National Democratic Institute (NDI), also excludes the CPRF from benefiting from NDI programs. A similar though informal exclusion took place in both of the civil society development projects discussed in this paper.


Bibliography


