Leonid Fridman
Professor, Head of the Department on
Central Asia and Caucasus.
Institute of Asian and African Studies of
the Moscow State University.
Central Asia: Ten Years
After
(Structural changes in the economy of
the Central Asian countries)
In the 90-ies of the last century all the
countries of the Central Asian region have come through the period of deep
structural changes, both internal and external, suffered economic, political and
sometimes military shocks (civil war in Tajikistan). As a result their economic
potential on the one hand has dwindled sharply, on the other hand displayed a
marked tendency towards economic development (See Table 1).
The duration of the economic crisis in the
transitional period in the Central Asian Republics (CAR) was different in each
country: It lasted from 5 years in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and up
to 6 years in Turkmenistan and 8 years in Tajikistan, where the maximum level of
merchandise and services production was reached as early as 1988. The depth of
the crisis also varied: in Tajikistan the volume of GDP has reduced in the worst
year of the crisis almost by three times, whenever in Uzbekistan - only by
17-18%. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan the production has dropped in
the worst year of the crisis nearly by 40-50%.
Yet during the last 4 - 6 years all the CAR
countries have showed some economic recovery, with different growth rates by
countries and years. Estimations show that by early 2001 the volume of GDP in
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan has reached about 70% - 75% of the pre -
crisis maximum, whenever in Tajikistan it hardly exceeded 40% of the relevant
level. At the same time in Uzbekistan, according to the official statistics, the
period of the recovery has nearly been completed, for in this
country the GDP has already reached 99% of the relevant 1991 level
and 95% - 97% of the 1990 level.
Both in the years of the crisis and during
the period of the recovery we have witnessed not only changes in the volume of
production of goods and services, but along with them various shifts in the
economic and social structures in the economy of CAR. It's these contradictory,
to a large extent unfavorable changes, that we are trying to analyze in
this report, which is predominantly based on the data of the employment
dynamics in the main branches of the economy. The analysis of these
changes makes it possible not to stick only to the fundamental changes and
distortions in the price indicators alone, which took place in the CAR as a
result of many years of inflation and liberalization of prices. In these
circumstances, it is the data indicating the changes in the number and ratio of
those employed in the main sectors and industries producing goods and services,
to identify more accurately the deep changes, that took place in the economy of
the CAR during the post - Soviet period.
Among these shifts it is necessary to point out,
first, a very important fact, which is an "agrarization" of the economy, or
rather employment in the agricultural sector as well as in fish production and
forestry, and it was especially pronounced in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The
agricultural sector of Kyrgyzstan employed in 1991 nearly 36%, and in 1999 -
already 52,5%, and in Tajikistan - relevantly 45% and 65% of the overall
employment; in Turkmenistan the increase of this indicator was less significant
- from 42 to 48%.
The tendency of the agrarization of the economy
(to be more exact - the field of the employment) in the 90-ies of the last
century is an exceptional phenomenon not only on a regional scale, but on the
world scale as well. Neither in the developed countries, nor in the developing
ones (at least in those with no hostilities) we were unable to identify a single
case of increasing the proportion of those employed in the agrosphere. Even in
the countries experiencing economic stagnation or decreasing GDP per
capita of the population, the ratio of those employed in the agriculture either
continued to decline or remained at the former level. And only in some East
European countries as well as in two European republics of the former USSR the
statistics marked the tendency similar to the above mentioned in the countries
of CAR. The countries in question were Bulgaria and Romania where the ratio of
those employed in agriculture in 1998 was relevantly by 2% and 10% higher (24%
and 26,3%, 30% and 40%) than in 1980, as well as in Moldova (43% and 46%) and
Latvia (16% and 19%)1.
We do not intend to undertake an analysis of the
reason and factors which brought about the process of agrarization in the
countries in question. The only factor they all share is the depth and the
length of the economic crisis accompanying their transition to the market
economy. But it's hardly possible to explain the process of the agrarization in
the employment in Romania, Latvia and Moldova solely by this factor: in Russia
as well as in Lithuania there was the same or even more considerable decline of
GDP. Yet, according to the available statistics, there was not any notable
increase in the ratio of those employed in the agriculture.
And now back to the present situation in
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan - we are going to analyze the dynamics
of the employment indicator in the agrosphere of these countries in a broader
historical context.
First, specific indicators of the employment in
agriculture for 1991 are by 4-5% higher than those in the last all-union
population census made in 1989. According to this census the relevant indicator
for Kyrgyzstan was 32%, Tajikistan - 41%, Turkmenistan - 37%. Certainly,
in the last years of the USSR part of the population of these republics could
come back to land, yet, this process could not have been so overwhelming.
Still, there is a chance that the information, provided by the census could be
"improved" for the political and ideological purposes, and the real scale of the
agriculture employment was somewhat underestimated and industrial employment, on
the contrary, overestimated, to prove the successful industrialization in the
republics of Central Asia. In any case, this problem needs further
investigation.
Second. If we compare the indicators for 1999 to
the relevant indicators of the previous population census, we shall find, that
the ratio of those employed in agriculture in Kyrgyzstan in 1999-2000
(52,5-52,9%) is almost equal to the relevant indicators for 1959 (!)
(53,5%). The data for 1999 - 2000 in Tajikistan (65% and 67.5%) were even higher
than the figures in the 1959 census (62.9%). Finally, the same indicator in
Turkmenistan also almost does not differ either from the figure for 1959
(49%). As it is well known, in normal market economies, including
the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the ratio of
employed in agriculture is, as a rule, in reverse proportion to the general
level of economic development of a relevant country. If this law
were applied to CAR, this would have meant that these countries were pushed back
by 30 - 40 years not only in the employment structure, but in the general
level of development due to transitional systemic crisis. However, such a
conclusion seems to be definitely exaggerated. It does not take into
consideration the specificity of the quickly changing conditions in these
countries. First, all the states of the Central Asian region have
passed the lowest points of the economic decline and resumed an economic growth
on a new market economy basis. Second, in spite of serious losses, it was
possible to preserve the key elements of a relatively developed infrastructure
of the economy. Third, their human potential, though noticeably weakened, still
can contribute to an accelerated economic growth under favorable conditions. But
anyway, the data mentioned above manifest negative trends and deep regressive
changes in the socio - economic structure of these countries*
On the contrary, according to the current
statistics, the share of the employed in agriculture in Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan decreased somewhat: from 24% to 22% and from 42% to 36%. However,
these figures should be carefully checked, since they contradict to other
statistical data for the same period. For example, according to the general
population census, in Kazakhstan not 21.9% but 26.4% were employed in
agriculture and forestry in 19992.
The data of the general population censes
usually are more exact in the structure and dynamics of employment. The
results of the population census of 1999 manifest an increase in the share of
employed in agriculture by the end of the 90-ies, as compared to the figures of
the previous censuses in 1989 (22.4%) and in 1979 (24.9%) differing very little
from the corresponding figure in 1970 (27.0%)3.
In other words, the employment ratio of the agriculture in Kazakhstan, according
to the data of the general population census, came back to the level of the
first half of the 70-ies.
This trend becomes even more evident, if we take
into consideration, that intensive movements of the titular population
from villages to cities were taking place in Kazakhstan during the 90-ies. Thus,
two contradictory trends were acting at the same time: on the one side, given
the crises in agriculture, many rural people moved to cities looking for work
and means of existence, on the other side, an agrarization of the rural regions
was continued. In some regions, where the employment in industry and
construction was falling particularly intensively, a part of the new city
dwellers returned to villages for agricultural activities, at least for several
months a year.
The data on employment received from the
population census of 1999 in Kazakhstan contradict that much to the figures of
the current statistics, that they also raise a lot of questions (these figures
are shown in the Table 2, line "Kazakhstan(2)" As it is known, the population of
Kazakhstan dropped by more than 2 million people, or approximately by 8-10%,
according to various estimations, as a result of emigration from the country.
In terms of current statistics, the general employment decreased at the
same time by 28% and even by 46% according to the census of 1999. However, this
may also mean, that the scope of the temporary labor migration from the
republic was not properly accounted for the past, the real constant population
figures were exaggerated, and, on the contrary, the scale of hidden unemployment
as well as that of temporary and even "imaginary" employment was understated.
Taking all these facts into consideration, it is necessary to state, that the
question about the real changes in the agricultural employment in Kazakhstan
between 1989 and 2000 still remains unanswered.
As to the current employment statistics in
Uzbekistan, they manifest a strong agrarian overpopulation in the country, short
- term and unregistered employment in rural regions. Otherwise, it is not
possible to clarify the fact, that according to the general population census of
1989, 35.2% were employed in agriculture that year while in the next year
the figure grew 39.3% and in 1991 to 41.9% (according to the data of the current
statistics). Further up to 1994 the agricultural employment kept growing,
accounting for 42.2% of the general employment. During the next four years the
value of this indicator fluctuated insignificantly, remaining within 39 - 40%.
And only in 1999 agricultural employment fell by 250 thousand people to
36% of the general employment. But such a strong slop down trend of this
indicator looks highly improbable, since it clearly contradicts to the changes
of another indicator: dynamics of the mainly non-agrarian population.
The data of current employment statistics
which manifest the general fall in the agricultural employment in Uzbekistan by
the end of 90-ies, clearly contradict to the dynamics of the ratio of the urban
population. We mean the process of a relative desurbanization in this, as well
as in some other countries of Central Asia: when in 1989 (and in 1979) 41% of
the total population lived in the cities of Uzbekistan, in 1999 only 37%
(36% in 1970 )4.
Surely, administrative limitations played a
certain role here, i.e. refusals to provide "residence permit" to village
dwellers who wished to move to cities so to say on legal terms. It is possible
to find numerous marginal population in the cities of Uzbekistan living
"between" city and village and falling out of the formal statistics.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine a noticeable decrease in the
agricultural employment with a simultaneous, even not very significant fall in
the share of the urban population, as it is indicated by the formal statistics.
The real magnitude of the relative desurbanization in Uzbekistan may be a little
lower than in official statistics, but this process is clarely going on in other
Central Asian states and it has a longer history.
As the materials of the population censes, not
only in Uzbekistan but also in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turmenistan indicate,
that during 70-80-ies, i.e. still in the Soviet period, either stagnation or
even a decrease in the share of the urban population was taking place. Its
share, for example, in Tajikistan reached the peak in 1979 (34.6%), while
ten years later it dropped to 32.6%. The census of 1999 indicates 28%
(32.6% in 1959), which definitely reflects the results of the lengthy civil war
and a deep social and economic crisis, followed by massive movements of
the population in various directions.
The share of the urban population in Turkmenistan
reached its peak as early as in 1970 (47.9%) and to 1989 it fell to 45.4%. By
the end of the 90-ies it decreased further to 43.6%, i.e. even below the level
of the 1959 census (46%). Such negative urbanization dynamics evidently
correspond to the growing level of the agrarian employment and consequently, of
the whole economy of Turkmenistan. The share of the urban population in
Kyrgyzstan did not exceed 38% in 1979 and 1989, while it fell to 35% according
to the 1999 census (33.7% in 1959).
Thus, the processes of stagnation and even a
decrease in the level of urbanization that started developing during the
last decade of the Soviet history of the Central Asian countries, accelerated
strongly under the conditions of a deep systemic crisis of the 90-ies. A
relative desurbanization of the population and a relative agrarization of the
employment manifested mainly regressive changes in the socio - economic
structures of these countries and corresponded to the values of the interrelated
and reverse-proportional indicators of agrarian employment and urbanization
during the 60-ies, i.e. 30-40 years ago.
In Kazakhstan, in contrast to the Central Asian
Republics, a permanent growth in the urban population ratio was registered
(50.3% in 1970, 53.5% in 1979, 57.2% in 1989). Its share according to the 1999
census reached 56%6 that meant the stagnation of this indicator during the
90-ies. However, in fact, much more contradictory processes working often in
opposite directions were taking place. The emigration from Kazakhstan accounted
for more than 2 million people. It consisted mainly of city dwellers, though the
country definitely lost a part of the agrarian population as well. At the same
time, while most emigrants from Kazakhstan probably originated from the Russian,
"European" urban population, the process of urbanization of the Kazakh
population was going on permanently: 30.9% of the total Kazakh population in
1979, 38.4% in 1989 and 43.3% in 1999 were living in cities5.
More important is the fact, that a noticeable fall
in the general urban population was registered in Kazakhstan in 1989 - 1999: by
755 - 900 thousand ( depending on the city criteria)6.
The population dynamics in the 39 biggest cities manifest an increase in 1989 -
1999 in 6 cities, first of all in the two capitals: Astana and Almaty, but only
by 137 thousand. Meanwhile the population in 29 cities dropped by 508 thousand.
Mining and industrial cities in the North and Central Kazakhstan suffered
mostly. A decrease in population in local centers and worker's settlements also
looks probable.
Thus, first, the size of the general urban
population in Kazakhstan has fallen. This became the most important specific
indicator of an absolute desurbanization of the country. Second, a decrease in
the agrarian population was going on at the same time. Because of that, the
level of the relative urbanization of the whole population did not change.
Third, under the conditions of the prevailing emigration of the "European"
population and a noticeable movement of the Kazakh village dwellers to
cities, the indicator of the relative urbanization of the titular population
grew essentially. This was not that much the result of the growing "city
attractiveness" but "pushing out" the village dwellers due to a deep agrarian
crisis.
The process of a relative desindustrialization of
the economy and employment was the major factor responsible for agrarization and
desurbanization of the population between 1991-1999. The materials of the
current statistics prove this. In Kazakhstan the share of the employed in
industry fell from 20.2% to 14.8% at that time, in construction from 10.3% to
3.5%. The relative indicators in Kyrgyzstan dropped from 18.0% to 9.0% and from
8.1% to 2.7%, in Tajikistan from 13% to 7.6% and from 7.5% to 2.5%, in
Uzbekistan from 14.7% to 12.7% and from 8.2% to 7.2%. A growth in the relative
employment from 10.4% to 12.5% was registered in Turkmenistan together with a
sharp decrease in the employment in construction (see Table 2).
Drawing the conclusion on the evident trend
towards a relative desindustrialization that is manifested by the falling share
of industrial employment in all CAR, except Turkmenistan, it is necessary to
point out, that simultaniosly intensity and scale of the investment process fell
dramatically in all Central Asian countries. This was displayed in a
strong fall in the employment in construction in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (by 34% - 73%) while the relevant decline in
Uzbekistan was relatively low and did not exceed 6%.
The fall in the number of the people employed in
the construction on such a scale meant intensifying underinvestment or
even desinvestment in the major branches of the economy in Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while the investment process in Uzbekistan continued
in general, though its intensity somewhat dropped.
Surely, the value, dynamics, branch and
territorial distribution, as well as the general efficiency of investments quite
often or even almost never corresponded to the real requirements of the economy
in one or another country in the conditions of the administrative - command
system and was dictated not only by economical but also by political,
ideological and military aims determined by the state and party
leadership.
*objectives, determined by the leaders of the
party and the state. Therefore, a certain contraction of the investment process,
especially during transition to market economy, seems to be well grounded.
However, the actual scale of this contraction, in our opinion, turned out to be
far larger than it was necessary, in many aspects making for the extreme depth
and duration of the economic crisis, negative dynamics of GDP, industrial and
agricultural production in the first half of the 90s.
Hitherto we've examined the dynamics of weights of
the economy's different sectors in the total employed population; nevertheless
the analysis of change in the absolute number of the employed in these sectors
is a matter of interest as well. Corresponding figures, received through current
statistical observations are contained in table 3.
Unbiased estimation of changes in the number and
sector-wise distribution of the employed population becomes possible only taking
into consideration the dynamics of the total resident population of the Central
Asian countries. According to the official and sometimes contradictory data,
from 1991 to 1999 the resident population of Kazakhstan reduced, as a result of
emigration, by at least 8-10%, and may be even by 11-12% (according to certain
independent researchers' estimates), while in other Central Asian countries it
increased, in spite of the emigration of a part of the European
population.
The direct comparison of data on the dynamics of
the total and the employed population shows that the latter was reducing in
Kazakhstan at least twice as fast; in Tajikistan it reduced by at least 12%,
while the total population grew by 13-14%. In Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan the employed population grew slower than the total resident
population. It is especially significant, given the fact that the age groups,
which entered the labor market in the 90s, had been forming under the conditions
of a higher population growth rate. In other words, the growth rate of capable
population in 90s was somewhat higher than the corresponding indicator, relating
to the total population.
Thus, the gap in the dynamics of total, capable
and employed population indicates the forming of large groups of the unemployed,
underemployed and occasionally employed people. Certainly, in the Soviet period
of the Central Asia's history, despite the officially proclaimed absence of
unemployment, it still existed in different - most often latent - forms, but
sometimes in open forms as well. The deep economic crisis inevitably resulted in
mass open unemployment and underemployment. In some Central Asian countries it
was admitted and in others - concealed by the official statistics. One can get a
picture of the real spread of unemployment and underemployment from the example
of Kazakhstan, where statistics more or less complies to the international
standards and where the results of the 1999 census were published. According to
the current official statistics 251 thousand unemployed were registered in 1999,
while according to the ILO's standards their number was 950 thousand people, or
11,3% of the country's total labor force. If we divide the number of the
unemployed by the number of the employed, the corresponding percentage indicator
would be 15,6%. This figure characterizes the acuteness of the problems on the
country's labor market.
The most surprising is the fact that in 1999, when
the general population census was conducted, only 4179 thousand, and not 6105
thousand, employed were registered in the country's economy. The discrepancy of
the two figures on general employment, mounting to more than 1,8 million people,
it too significant and therefore can't be explained by occasional inaccuracies.
In both cases calculating all the employed in large-scale and small-scale
industries, the employees as well as the employers and the self-employed was
proclaimed. Two hypotheses to explain this discrepancy can be offered. Firstly,
the country's total resident population could have been overestimated during all
these years, i.e. the real emigration and especially labor migration from
Kazakhstan was underestimated. Secondly, though the both surveys' statistical
approaches to calculating employment were formally identical, in the case of the
census mainly full-time employees were calculated. Thus a great number of
partially employed persons and casual workers were not counted. Perhaps, both
hypotheses are correct. Our conversations with economists and reading
Kazakhstan's press indicate the possibility that the previously published data
on the total population and the employed population could have been
overstated.
The situation in Kazakhstan is in many aspects
unique, but it is clear that the discrepancies in the dynamics of the total and
the employed population in other Central Asian countries indicate the appearance
and expansion of mass unemployment, underemployment and "alleged" employment
there. At that, in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan rural overpopulation is
especially high, while in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan all the forms of open and
latent unemployment coexist in rural and urban areas. Official statistics
doesn't allow giving the correct estimates of its absolute and relative
magnitude, but we can presume, that in Tajikistan the dimension of unemployment
and underemployment's spread, due to obvious reasons, is especially large. In
Kyrgyzstan, according to our estimates, it is somewhat smaller than in
Kazakhstan. In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the open unemployment is less
widespread, while underemployment, casual and even alleged employment cover a
large part of the labor force, perhaps 5 to 10% of the economically active
population or even more.
Studying the dynamics of the number of the
employed in separate fields of the economy's so-called real sector, i.e. first
of all agriculture and industry, allows recognizing a number of important,
distinct, yet contradictory tendencies. For example, according to the current
statistical data (see table 3), in 1991-1999 in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Turkmenistan the total number of the employed in agriculture increased by 27%
(Tajikistan), 37% (Turkmenistan) and even 49% (Kyrgyzstan). At the same time,
the physical volume of agricultural production in 1999 constituted, compared to
the 1991 level, 65% in Tajikistan, 70-75% (our estimate) in Turkmenistan and 98%
in Kyrgyzstan (see table 4). In other words, agricultural production per
employed person in these countries decreased substantially. Besides, the year
1991 was not very favorable for the Central Asian countries' agriculture, and
the volume of farming production in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan dropped by 8-10%
and in Tajikistan - by 4% compared to the previous year. So, the actual drop in
the agricultural workers' productivity was even more significant in these
countries. At the same time, in Uzbekistan, according to the official data, the
agricultural labor productivity even increased slightly in 1999, however in
1998, according to the same data, it decreased insignificantly. We would like to
remind, that the number of the employed in this sector in 1999 was, probably,
substantially understated. Therefore we can presume, that the agricultural labor
efficiency in Uzbekistan either remained unchanged or (most probably) decreased
not as significantly as in other countries of the Central Asia.
The situation in the Kazakhstan's agriculture is
of special interest. Here, according to current statistical observations, the
number of the employed decreased to the same extent as the volumes of
production. Nevertheless, it was Kazakhstan, where the agricultural output in
1991 decreased, due to unfavorable weather conditions, by 10% compared to 1990.
And secondly, according to current statistical data the number of the employed
in agriculture constituted 71% from the level of 1991, while the corresponding
figure in the census was 60%. It is quiet possible that the actual figure is
somewhere between 60 and 71%. In this case it would mean that decrease in the
agricultural labor efficiency in Kazakhstan, if it actually occurred, was
smaller than in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
In contrast to agriculture, the employment in
industry in all the Central Asian countries except for Turkmenistan was
decreasing in 1991-1999 (tables 2,3), however, the pattern of this process was
different in every country of the region. If we stick to the current statistical
data, it turns out that industrial employment declined most significantly in
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and least significantly - in Uzbekistan. But, basing
on the Kazakhstan's national census data, we would see that the industrial
employment in the country decreased in 1991-1999 not by 42%, but by 56%.
Apparently, the actual figure is not 42 or 56, but approximately 50%. In other
words, the decrease of industrial employment in Kazakhstan was of about the same
scale as in Kyrgyzstan and post-war Tajikistan. This can be explained by the
fact, that the scope of industrialization in the Soviet period of the country's
history was particularly impressive; many mining industries were developed here,
whose produce was intended for the whole USSR and mainly for its military
industries. Many Kazakhstan's manufacturing industries also served the heavy
industry and the military-industrial complex of the whole USSR. Decrease in
military spendings and the break-up of economic ties after the disintegration of
the Soviet Union made the deep crisis of these important components of
Kazakhstan's industrial system inevitable.
At the same time, the total number of industrial
employees in Turkmenistan, on the contrary, increased almost by a half. This is
explained by the country's course on slow, gradual evolution of the economic
system; and in the industrial sector - on the development of the industry's
traditional branches (natural gas, petroleum) as well as building of factories
meant for deeper processing of local raw materials and growth of textile and
certain other industries.
Comparison of the data on the dynamics of
employment and volumes of industrial production (table 4) suggests that in
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and, probably, in Turkmenistan as well, the labor
productivity dropped; in Kazakhstan it possibly remained at the same level and
in Uzbekistan, according to the official statistics, even grew slightly.
However, taking into account the imperfections, characteristic to the
statistical accounting of employment and production in the Central Asian
countries, and the fast changes of economic situation in some of them (for
example, in Turkmenistan in 1999-2001), these conclusions may be adjusted in
future, as soon as new, more accurate statistical data appears.
Summarizing the results of the analysis of the
general situation in the Central Asian countries' industrial sector (including
construction), we should note that total employment in this sector slightly
increased (or, perhaps, remained at the same level) only in Turkmenistan, while
in other countries of the region it dropped significantly. Partially, it was due
to the inevitable process of adaptation to the new conditions, to the new market
economy and integration into the global economy. The fact is doubtless, that the
old economic structure, with all its deformations, needed radical
reorganization. However, this reorganization should have included modernization
of the system's basic elements, including not only the real sector, but also
social infrastructure, science and other essential components of a modern
economy.
Meanwhile the dynamics of employment in such
important sectors as education, public health and especially science shows, that
in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan the total number of workers decreased
in 1991-1999 even more than the total number of the employed in the national
economy. At the same time in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the number of people
employed in education and public health continued to grow. Of course, in
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where many patterns of the old socio-economic
system were preserved, the old policy implying extensive development of
traditional industries - and therefore extension of employment, as an imminent
aspect of such development - continued. However, in other Central Asian
countries, that chose the way of radical, rapid and to a certain extent shocking
changes, the decrease in the number of the employed in the sectors of education
and public health did not lead to the improvement of their functioning, i.e. for
example decrease in the rate of morbidity and infant mortality, increase in
literacy rate and in the quality of education in schools and higher educational
institutions.
The results in this sphere turned out to be
extremely contradictory: more and more significant stratification,
differentiation of schools, hospitals, colleges and other institutions of social
infrastructure went on. At that, some of them commercialized, became accessible
only for the more well-off sections of the population and usually (but not
always) provided better medical care, higher quality of theoretical education
and vocational training. Other schools, hospitals and colleges on the contrary
found themselves in difficult financial situation, continuously lacked funds,
lost the most qualified specialists - all of this leaded to adverse effects. It
is probably impossible to measure the dynamics of the effectiveness of the
education system, public health and other elements of social infrastructure,
like it is done with agriculture or industry. Even the set of common indicators,
used in such cases (literacy rate, the number of pupils on each of the stages of
education per thousand of citizens or their percentage in a corresponding age
group, specific morbidity and mortality in different age groups and so on), is
unable to correctly reflect not only the quantitative, but in the first place
qualitative characteristics of the functioning of such complex social systems.
Moreover, some of those indicators (number of schoolchildren, students,
teachers, physicians) reflect rather "expenses" than the effects, while others
(for example, morbidity or mortality rate) depend not only (and not largely)
upon the quality of medical service but on the ecologic situation, dynamics of
personal incomes and other factors, that are hard to single out. That's why we
have to repeat, that the change in the number of the employed in the basic
segments of the social sphere leaded to extremely contradictory results, which
cannot be estimated unambiguously.
Science is gaining more and more importance in the
modern world, both in agrarian-industrial countries and in the countries with
the rapidly growing informational and innovational sector (of course, the
importance of science differs depending on countries' level of development).
During the Soviet period of the Central Asian countries' history a certain
scientific potential was built up here. Its creation was called forth not only
by the economy's actual needs, but by the political and ideological factors as
well. Furthermore, the sphere of science and scientific services, as it was
reflected in the Soviet statistics, included not only the people who were really
engaged in scientific activities, but also those who were connected with science
only marginally; this was done in order to prove the advantages of the socialist
system. As a result, the data of the Soviet statistics, concerning the number of
the employed in the sphere of science, were always overstated and therefore
could not be compared to the corresponding indicators of the international
statistics. 7
That's why we have to adduce two groups of figures: table 2 contains the figures
concerning the dynamics of the number of the employed from the traditional
section "Science and science services", which was preserved in the statistics of
the Central Asian countries since the Soviet era. But we also use the data
(cited below) on the number of persons, actually engaged in scientific research
and development. The analysis of the first group of statistics shows, that the
number of the employed in this sphere dropped twofold in Uzbekistan and three-
five-fold in other countries of the region. Such large-scale decreases in the
number of the employed were not registered in any other sector of the economy.
And though this can be partially explained by the excessive "swelling" of the
scientific (more exactly, quasi-scientific) sphere in Soviet times, it is
unlikely, that this process just compensated the deformations, brought to life
by the command economy, its political and ideological priorities. To
characterize the current situation in the scientific community more correctly it
is necessary to analyze the second group of data, concerning those who actually
performed research. According to the official information, the number of people
engaged in scientific research and development decreased in Uzbekistan from 41
to 15 thousand, in Tajikistan in 1991-1997 decreased from 4,4 to 1,3 thousand
and then increased again to 2,7 thousand; in Kyrgyzstan - decreased in 1991-1999
from 5,7 to 2,5 thousand and in Kazakhstan - from 27,6 to 10,8 thousand
people8.
Unfortunately, concerning Turkmenistan only the figures of the total number of
the employed in the sphere of science and science services are available; their
number decreased during the same years from 14 to 5,2 thousand
people.
Thus, the magnitude of the decrease in the number
of actual researchers turned out to be smaller than for the wider category of
the people allegedly engaged in the scientific process. Nevertheless, such
impressive contraction of the research and development sector, usually justified
by the lack of funds, by the necessity to reduce the number of employees in
overstaffed laboratories and research institutes and by other considerations of
the same kind, not just painfully affected the lives of thousands of people, but
also led to very contradictory results.
Many former researchers, who had been holding the
poorly paid positions of junior research assistants for many years, were forced
to find new jobs. Some of them became businessmen; employees, managers or
directors of banks, trading or industrial companies. The fact that such
specialists staffed the institutions of the forming market economy certainly
contributed to their efficiency. At the same time, many former researchers were
practically thrown into the sphere of retail trade, engaged into "shuttle"
business and sometimes even became unemployed, lost their qualification,
suffered acute psychological crises, joined the marginal sections of the
population.
Finally, those who continue research and
development are also subject to certain stratification. Some of them get all
they can from the new opportunities, find new sources of financing, in addition
to the scarce governmental funds, expand contacts with the colleagues abroad,
thus increasing the effectiveness of their own research. Others, on the
contrary, failed to adapt to the new environment, formed by the lack of
governmental funding, their working efficiency decreased, often resulting in
further cuts of science spendings. Thus, the changes going on in this sphere can
also be characterized as contradictory, since it is very hard to find the
resultant of such discrepant processes and coming to an "unequivocal" conclusion
seems impossible (at least at the current stage of our research).
As far as we know, the only source of statistical
data on the dynamics of the research activities' results is the costs of
scientific and technical works, expressed in percentage to the GDP of each of
the Central Asian countries. On the whole, this indicator decreased in all of
the countries; however, the magnitude of this decrease varied substantially: in
Tajikistan this indicator decreased from 0,44 to 0,06%, in Kazakhstan - from
0,56 to 0,19%, in Uzbekistan - from 1,16 to 0,36% and in Kyrgyzstan - from 0,33
to 0,14% of the GDP.9
Data for Turkmenistan for the recent years is not available.
In order to get the figures, characterizing the
changes of absolute values of scientific and technical works' costs, we have to
multiply the figure for 1999 by the GDP index of this year in its comparison
with 1991. For example, in Kazakhstan in 1999 the costs scientific and technical
works mounted to 0,19% of GDP, the 1999 GDP itself was 0,7 of its 1991 value,
thus the comparable figure for the scientific and technical works' costs is
0,19%x0,7=0,13%. In other words, the total costs of scientific and technical
works, performed by researchers in Kazakhstan decreased from 1991 to 1999 4,3
times, while the total number of researchers in the country decreased 2,5 - 2,6
times. One may conclude after comparing these figures that working efficiency of
researchers in Kazakhstan (and other Central Asian republics, where these
figures' ratio is similar) decreased by at least 40%. However, such a conclusion
can't be called well grounded, because the "scientific and technical works'
costs" indicator characterizes mainly the spendings on scientific research.
Moreover, the approaches to calculating this indicator may be more or less
arbitrary. What concerns certain "partial" indicators of scientific works'
efficiency (for example, the number of applications for patents or granted
patents, number of scientific articles in leading journals, or the citation
index), such data is unavailable for the whole 1991-1999 period, and separate
figures for the recent years don't allow to get the idea of these indicators'
dynamics.
Let's summarize our analysis of the processes that
reflected in the sphere of employment the most important macroeconomic and
macrosocial transitional shifts on the way of the Central Asian countries from
quasi-socialist system towards market economy. Agrarization,
de-industrialization, de-urbanization, sharp relative and absolute contraction
of investment processes, contraction (relative or even absolute) of the
education and public health spheres, loss of a significant part of the
scientific potential - all these, and those connected with them, tendencies
under ordinary, "common" circumstances indicate intensification of regressive
trends in the life of countries, societies, and large social groups. And if
these changes would have been the only changes, going on in the Central Asian
countries in the 90s, we could have limited ourselves to such a
conclusion.
However, two circumstances make such a conclusion
insufficient and even incorrect. Firstly, almost all of these tendencies, at
least partially, were necessary to repair the deep structural warps and
deformations that reached their peak by the end of the existence of the USSR's
non-market, even anti-market economy. Moreover, the forming of new market
structures in the countries of the Central Asia was complicated by the
disintegration of old economic ties, appearance and aggravation of the
limitations, formed by the contraction of both demand and supply of goods and
services in the context of new, small or medium (in the terms of their economic
and human potential). But these statements and explanations do not change the
fact, that, for example, the decrease of the proportion and even total number of
urban population, drop in industrial employment, contraction of scientific
activities, educational sphere, expansion of primitive economic patterns in
agriculture or goods producing network - from the viewpoint of the global
historical development and under present conditions - evidence the
intensification (perhaps temporary) of regressive and not progressive tendencies
and patterns.
But, secondly, (and it is more important) in the
90s in all the countries of the Central Asia the (more or less intensive)
process of formation and development of new market structures and institutions
was underway. Usually the term "reforming" is used when analyzing the
transformation of the economic and socio-politic structure of the Central Asian
countries. However, from the global historical viewpoint, the process is
revolutionary (and for certain people, perhaps, counter-revolutionary) in
nature, as it signifies the transition from one system, which implied total
governmentalization of property as well as of social and political life, to
another, characterized by the prevalence of private property and democratic
mechanisms in social sphere and administration. Of course, in the Central Asian
countries this process haven't finished, and in some cases it is just passing
through its primary stages; in certain countries backward movements in politics
or economy may be observed, so we may speak only about the main direction, the
principal vector of development.
But no matter how slow, contradictory and painful
this process was, still in every country reforming of socio-economic structures
and creation of market institutions took place. In this connection it is enough
to mention the prices' liberalization, which, due to its thoroughness,
inevitably leads to the narrowing and then disappearance of goods' deficit; the
privatization of small, medium and some large enterprises in commerce, services,
agriculture, construction, industry and economy's other sectors; appearance of
stock, commodity, currency exchanges, stock companies and other forms of private
businesses, functioning with the use of hired or just family labor; formation of
the two-level banking system, under which more or less branched system of
commercial banks coexists with the governmental central bank; issuing national,
partially convertible currencies; gradual liberalization of currency exchange
regulations and creation of the conditions, promoting foreign investments;
creation of national export and import regulation systems; finally, creating
preconditions for the formation of normally functioning goods, labor, capital
and services markets.
The enumeration of all these reforms evidences the
unprecedented difficulty of the tasks, which the Central Asian countries were
facing after they started their independent development. Moreover, those tasks
were to be completed in relatively short period and given that three successive
generations lived, studied and worked in the context of anti-market economic
system. This is one of the differences between the countries of the Central Asia
and the East European countries, where only 1 - 2 generations lived under
similar conditions (and what is more, in Eastern Europe private property was
partially preserved in some sectors of the economy). It is relatively easy to
quickly replace old machines and mechanisms by the new ones, but it is much
harder to change people, their skills, knowledge, attitudes, etc. This process
requires more time and is connected with many difficulties, psychological
crises, material and spiritual losses. All of this inevitably affects the
results of the Central Asian countries' economic dynamics.
We do not intend to thoroughly analyze the
economic reforms; they can be subject of a separate study. Since we examine
mainly macroeconomic and macrosocial changes and shifts, it is necessary to
adduce the general results of the property structure reforms, which is the main
basis and primary precondition of all the systemic changes in the Central Asian
region.
According to the available calculations and
estimates, by the end of the 90s the enterprises of the private and mixed
sectors accounted for 75% (in 2000 - 77%) of the employed and 55% of GDP
production in Kazakhstan; in Kyrgyzstan - 73 and 70% correspondingly; in
Tajikistan - 61-62 and 30-35%; in Turkmenistan - 59 and 25-30% and in Uzbekistan
- 69 and 45%.10
Thus, in all the Central Asian countries the private and mixed sectors
accumulate the larger part of the employed labor force, while the share of these
sectors in GDP is more than a half in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and less tan a
half in other republics. These facts evidence significant advancement of the
Central Asian countries towards the market economy, which now involves the
majority of their capable population.
In the light of the aforesaid and taking into
account what has been said concerning the reforms, conducted in the countries of
the Central Asia, we can give a more grounded and precise estimation of the
changes and shifts that were taking place in the region in the 90s. Inevitable
problems and difficulties of the transitional period, partial agrarization,
de-industrialization and de-urbanization, relative or even absolute reduction of
educational, medical and scientific potential as well as other similar
tendencies indicated, on one hand, the growing traditionalization and sometimes
even primitivization, archaization and temporary chaotization of the economy and
social structure. But, on the other hand, those tendencies contradictorily
combined with the appearance and development of the structures and institutions
of the new, modern, market and (in future) democratic nature, typical for
modernizing countries, societies, small and large social groups as well as for
individuals. These elements of modernization have been continuously growing, the
corresponding process intensified as the Central Asian countries were gradually
integrating into the system of international economic ties, the content and
dynamics of which is determined by the developed countries. As a result, economy
and everyday life of the Central Asian countries' urban and rural population is
marked by an extremely contradictory interaction, coexistence, but also
"struggle" of diametrically opposite tendencies: traditional (primitive) and
modern, chaotic and systemizing, regressive and progressive in their
nature.
In the 90s agrarization, de-industrialization,
de-urbanization and de-scientization led not to modernization, but rather to
traditionalization, primitivization and even archaization of the Central Asian
countries' economy and social structure, but in future the transition to
accelerated economic growth, basing on the patterns of catch-up development,
will inevitably call for providing comprehensive support to the educational and
public health systems, preserving and developing the actual scientific
potential, carrying out rational industrialization conducive to the rise of the
economy's efficiency, as well as intensification of
agriculture.
Dynamics of the GNP in the Central Asian
Republics and in some other countries in 1991-2000 ãã.
(in per cent to the previous
year)
Table 1
Ñòðàíû |
Average annual growth
(decrease) rate 1990-2000 |
1992 |
1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
Kazakhstan |
-4,6 |
-5,3 |
-9,2 |
-12,6 |
-8,2 |
+0,5 |
+1,7 |
-1,9 |
+2,7 |
+9,6 |
Kyrgyzstan |
-4,1 |
-13,9 |
-15,5 |
-20,1 |
-5,4 |
+7,1 |
+9,9 |
+2,1 |
+3,7 |
+5,0 |
Tajikistan |
?* |
-29,0 |
-11,0 |
-18,9 |
-12,5 |
-4,4** |
+1,7 |
+5,3 |
+3,7 |
+8,3 |
Turkmenistan |
-4,8 |
-5,3 |
-10,2 |
-19,0 |
-8,2 |
-7,7 |
-11,3 |
+5,0 |
+16,0 |
+18 |
Uzbekistan |
-0,5 |
-11,0 |
-2,3 |
-4,2 |
-0,9 |
+1,6 |
+2,4 |
+4,4 |
+4,4 |
+4,0 |
Russia |
-4,8 |
-14,0 |
-9,0 |
-13,0 |
-4,0 |
-3,0 |
+1,0 |
-5,0 |
+3,5 |
+8,0 |
China |
+10,3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Iran |
+3,6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Turkey |
+3,7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
USA |
+3,4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sources: IMF Finance and Development,
Washington DC, September 2000, p.42
World Bank World Development Report
2001/2002, pp.294-295; 2001/2002, pp.232-233, 236-237;
CIS Statistical Bulletin, January
2001, No.2, pp11, 122.
Notes:
* There is an evident misprint in the text of World
Development Report 2001/2002:(-1,7), p.237.
The same indicator
for 1990-1999 equaled (-9,9).
** The figure for Tajikistan in 1996 is 17,7%
(Statistical Bulletin of the CIS, 2001, No.2, p.122.)
The data
for Russia (1992-1998) are rounded off.
Table 2
Employment in the CIS countries in various branches of the economy (in
thousands, in per cent)
Country |
Total |
of which: |
Agriculture |
Industry |
Construction |
Transport and
communications |
Trade |
Education |
Healthcare |
Science |
Public services |
|
1991 |
1999 |
1991 |
1999 |
1991 |
1999 |
1991 |
1999 |
1991 |
1999 |
1991 |
1999 |
1991 |
1999 |
1991 |
1999 |
1991 |
1999 |
1991 |
1999 |
in
thousands |
1
Kazakhstan*
2 |
7716 |
6105 |
1876 |
1335 |
1561 |
904 |
796 |
211 |
637 |
576 |
576 |
1398 |
813 |
513 |
453 |
320 |
121 |
29 |
222 |
186 |
4172 |
1116 |
695 |
142 |
362 |
450 |
483 |
275 |
- |
324 |
Kyrgyzstan |
1731 |
1764 |
622 |
926 |
311 |
158 |
140 |
48 |
93 |
65 |
108 |
178 |
212 |
156 |
107 |
92 |
27 |
5,4 |
37 |
66 |
Tajikistan |
1970 |
1726 |
881 |
1118 |
257 |
131 |
148 |
43 |
93 |
40 |
108 |
70 |
222 |
179 |
106 |
75 |
26 |
5 |
41 |
25 |
Turkmenistan |
1527 |
1837 |
646 |
888 |
159 |
230 |
163 |
108 |
90 |
91 |
86 |
116 |
177 |
190 |
84 |
89 |
14 |
5,2 |
34 |
29 |
Uzbekistan |
8255 |
8885 |
3458 |
3220 |
1213 |
1124 |
680 |
640 |
399 |
370 |
464 |
735 |
950 |
1023 |
488 |
538 |
100 |
50 |
103 |
122 |
Russia |
73848 |
63963 |
9970 |
8740 |
22400 |
14300 |
8490 |
5080 |
5750 |
4920 |
5626 |
9320 |
7273 |
7063 |
4305 |
4500 |
2769 |
1209 |
1722 |
2858 |
% |
1
Kazakhstan
2 |
100 |
100 |
24,3 |
21,9 |
20,2 |
14,8 |
10,3 |
3,5 |
8,3 |
9,4 |
7,5 |
22,9 |
10,5 |
8,4 |
5,9 |
5,2 |
1,6 |
0,5 |
2,9 |
3,0 |
- |
100 |
- |
26,4 |
- |
16,6 |
- |
3,4 |
- |
8,7 |
- |
10,8 |
- |
11,6 |
- |
6,6 |
- |
- |
- |
7,7 |
Kyrgyzstan |
100 |
100 |
35,9 |
52,5 |
18,0 |
9,0 |
8,1 |
2,7 |
5,4 |
3,7 |
6,2 |
10,1 |
12,2 |
8,8 |
6,2 |
5,2 |
1,6 |
0,3 |
2,1 |
3,7 |
Tajikistan |
100 |
100 |
44,7 |
64,8 |
13,0 |
7,6 |
7,5 |
2,5 |
4,7 |
2,3 |
5,5 |
4,1 |
11,3 |
10,4 |
5,4 |
4,3 |
1,3 |
0,3 |
2,1 |
1,4 |
Turkmenistan |
100 |
100 |
42,3 |
48,3 |
10,4 |
12,5 |
10,7 |
5,9 |
5,9 |
5,0 |
5,6 |
6,3 |
11,6 |
10,3 |
5,5 |
4,8 |
0,9 |
0,3 |
2,2 |
1,6 |
Uzbekistan** |
100 |
100 |
41,9 |
36,2 |
14,7 |
12,7 |
8,2 |
7,2 |
4,8 |
4,2 |
5,6 |
8,3 |
11,5 |
11,5 |
5,9 |
6,1 |
1,2 |
0,6 |
1,2 |
1,4 |
Russia |
100 |
100 |
13,5 |
13,7 |
30,3 |
22,4 |
11,5 |
7,9 |
7,8 |
7,7 |
7,6 |
14,6 |
9,8 |
11,0 |
5,8 |
7,0 |
3,7 |
1,9 |
2,3 |
4,5 |
Notes:
* The data for Kazakhstan in the
line 1 are taken from the current statistics, in line 2 from the general
population census 1999.
** According to the data for 1997 in
Uzbekistan.in agriculture were employed 40,7%, in industry 12,8%, in
construction 8,7%, in transport and communications 4,1%, in trade 8,2%, in
education 12,3%, in healthcare 5,8%, in science 0,5%, in public services
1,3%.
Calculated on the basis of:
Interstate Statistical Committee of the
Commonwealth of Independent States, Commonwealth of Independent States in 1999.
Statistical Yearbook (farther CIS99), Moscow, 2000, pp. 269, 316, 414-415,
464-465, 509, 540-541.
Employment in the Republic of Kazakhstan,
vol.2, Almaty, 2000, pp. 80-83, 84-87.
Table 3
Changes in employment in the branches of
the economy in the CIS countries (in per cent in 1999 to 1991)
Country |
Total |
Of which: |
Agriculture |
Industry |
Construction |
Transport and
communications |
Trade |
Education |
Healthcare |
Science |
Public services |
(1)
Kazakhstan
(2) |
-21 |
-29 |
-42 |
-73 |
-10 |
+143 |
-37 |
-29 |
-76 |
-16 |
-46 |
-40,5 |
-55,5 |
-82 |
-43 |
-22 |
-41 |
-39 |
- |
+46 |
Kirgizstan |
+2 |
+49 |
-49 |
-66 |
-30 |
+65 |
-26 |
-14 |
-80 |
+78 |
Tajikistan |
-12 |
+27 |
-49 |
-71 |
-57 |
-35 |
-19 |
-29 |
-81 |
-39 |
Turkmenistan |
+25 |
+37 |
+45 |
-34 |
+1 |
+35 |
+7 |
+6 |
-63 |
-15 |
(1)
Uzbekistan
(2) |
+8 |
-7 |
-7 |
-6 |
-7 |
+58 |
+8 |
+10 |
-50 |
+18 |
+7 |
+0,3 |
-6 |
-15 |
-9 |
+55 |
+5 |
+3 |
-50 |
+8 |
Russia |
-13 |
-12 |
-36 |
-40 |
-14 |
+66 |
-3 |
+5 |
-56 |
+66 |
Notes:
Kazakhstan (1) according to the current employment statistics
Kazakhstan (2) according to the population census of 1999
Sources: calculated on the same basis as Table
2.
Table 4
Index numbers of employment, output and
productivity of labor in CAR in 1991-1999
( 1991= 100)
Country |
Agriculture |
Industry |
|
Employment |
Output |
Productivity of
labor |
Employment |
Output |
Productivity of
labor |
Kazakhstan |
71 (60)1 |
70 |
99 (117)1 |
58 (45)1 |
50 |
85 (111)1 |
Kyrgyzstan |
149 |
98 |
66 |
51 |
48 |
94 |
Tajikistan |
127 |
65 |
51 |
51 |
38 |
75 |
Uzbekistan |
93 (100)2 |
99 (93,4)2 |
106 (93,4)2 |
93 |
115 |
124 |
Notes: 1). In brackets are the indexes, calculated on the basis of
population census of Kazakhstan 1999. See: Employment in the Republic of
Kazakhstan, vol. 2, Almaty 2000, p. 80-81
2). In brackets are the indexes for 1998.
Sources: Index numbers of the industrial and agriculture production, as
well as those of employment are calculated on the basis of: CIS'99, pp. 27, 269,
316, 464-465, 540-541; 509.
References
1 See: World
Development Indicators 2001, World Bank, Washington DC, 2001.
2 See: Employment in
the Republic of Kazakhstan. Volume 2. Employment in the Republic of Kazakhstan
by types of economic activities. The results of the population census of 1999 in
the Republic of Kazakhstan. Almaty, 2000,p.28)
3 Here and later see
the data on the structure of the branch employment for 1959-1989 in the
population censes in the publication L. A. Fridman, O. V. Karazhas.
Structural Changes in the Economy of Central Asia and Transcaucasian Republics
(on the basis of the population censuses in 1926 – 1989). Bulletin of the MSU.
Series 13, Oriental Studies 1994, ¹2, p.6).
4 Here and further
see the data on urban population ratios in CAR in CAR'99, pp.268, 315, 463, 508,
539; World Development Report 2000/2001, World Bank 2001, pp.276-277; World
Development Indicators 2001, pp.28-30.
5 See: Republic of
Kazakhstan. Statistical Yearbook of Kazakhstan 2000, Almaty,
2000,p.445.
6 See: Kazakhstan's
Institute of Strategical Research at the President of Kazakhstan. Analytical
Review. 1.01.01. Almaty 2000, pp.30; Republic of Kazakhstan. Statistical
Yearbook 2000. Almaty 2000, pp. 429, 446; L.A. Fridman, O.V. Korazhas, ob. cit.,
p.6.
7 For more details
see L.A. Fridman "Science in a transitional society. Russia in the world
context.” Russian School of Economics, Moscow, 1998
8 See “CIS'99”, pp.
310, 360, 503, 575
9 See “CIS'99”, pp.
310, 360, 503, 575
10 See “CIS'99”;
CIS, Statistical Bulletin 2001, ¹2; IMF, Occasional Paper, 183, Economic Reforms
in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,
Washington, 1999, p.2; Finance and Development, September, 2000, p.41).